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INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court decided United States v. Mead Corp.
four years ago,1 Justice Scalia predicted that judicial review of agency
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Professor, Vanderbilt Law School. I am grateful for insightful
comments on earlier drafts to Michael Bressman, Tracey George, Richard Nagareda, Suzanna
Sherry, and Michael Vandenbergh. I am indebted for excellent research assistance to Sara
Broach, Brian Fleming, and Lily Li Huang.
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action would devolve into chaos. This Article puts that prediction to
the test by examining the court of appeals decisions applying the
decision. Justice Scalia actually understated the effect of Mead. This
Article suggests a remedy for the mess.
In Mead, the Court held that an agency is entitled to deference
under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC2 only if Congress has delegated
to that agency the authority to issue interpretations that carry the
force of law, and the agency has used that authority in issuing a
particular interpretation.3 Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that
Mead makes an "avulsive change" in judicial review of agency action,
the consequences of which "will be enormous, and almost uniformly
bad."4 On his reading, "what was previously a general presumption of
authority in agencies to resolve ambiguity in the statutes they have
been authorized to enforce has been changed to a presumption of no
such authority, which must be overcome by affirmative legislative
intent."5 Lower courts, he warned, would not know what to make of
the decision in practice: "We will be sorting out the consequences of
the Mead doctrine, which today has replaced the Chevron doctrine, for
years to come." 6
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's doomsday forecast, the
majority believed that Mead was justified in principle. The Court
stated that Mead "tailors deference to [the] variety" of administrative
procedures that Congress envisions and agencies employ. 7 An agency
may receive Chevron deference as long as it chooses a proper
procedure for issuing interpretations of the statute it administers.8
Thus, an agency may receive Chevron deference if it chooses a
procedure that Congress generally intends to produce interpretations
with the "force of law" - as with notice-and-comment rulemaking or
1. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
2. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the Court articulated the following two-step test:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43.
3. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231-33.
4. Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
7. Id. at 236.
8. Id.
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formal adjudication. 9  But an agency might not receive Chevron
deference when it selects a more informal procedure unless the
circumstances specifically suggest that Congress would have intended
the resulting interpretation to carry the force of law. 10 The agency
may, however, still earn judicial respect under Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 1 if it produces an interpretation that reflects 'a body of
experience and informed judgment"' upon which courts, though not
required, may rely. 12
This Article examines the effects of Mead by studying the court
of appeals opinions that have purported to follow the decision.13 Years
have passed since Mead was decided, and we still lack a clear answer
to the question when an agency is entitled to Chevron deference for
procedures other than notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication. Lower courts adopt inconsistent approaches. Many find
ways to avoid the question altogether. Others use Mead in ways
broader than the Court intended.
First, courts adopt inconsistent approaches to the issue of
Chevron deference when an agency does not use notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication. 14 Without fully recognizing their
differences, courts vacillate from one set of considerations to another
to determine whether an agency has issued an interpretation with the
force of law. Some courts embrace the considerations articulated in
Mead - namely, that an interpretation is entitled to Chevron
deference, even if rendered through procedures other than notice-and-
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, as long as it "foster[s]
fairness and deliberation" and "bespeaks the type of legislative
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
12. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998), and
quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). Under Skidmore, agencies get deference only to the extent
they offer interpretations with the "power to persuade." Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. As the
Skidmore Court stated: 'The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control." Id.
13. This Article does not attempt to perform a quantitative analysis of the opinions. Nor
does it aim to explore the underlying context of the decisions or broader agenda of the panels.
Rather, it provides a critical reading of the cases - taking them for 'what they are and
interpreting them for what they say. I assembled the cases for the Article by searching Westlaw
on November 18, 2004 for a "Keycite" of United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). I
collected 147 "Citing References," comprised of 18 "Negative Cases" and 129 "Positive Cases." In
the Article, I examine cases from the United States Courts of Appeals, numbering 16 "Negative
Cases" and 66 "Positive Cases."
14. See infra Part II.A.
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activity that naturally binds more than the parties to the ruling."'15
But other courts apply the considerations later announced in
Barnhart v. Walton, including "the interstitial nature of the legal
question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the
question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that
administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given
the question over a long period of time."'16 The Supreme Court has not
clarified the relationship between Mead and Barnhart, which were
decided only one Term apart. As a result, it has left lower courts
simply to choose between them. But rather than a split in the circuits
between those consistently applying Mead and those consistently
applying Barnhart, we see individual panels favoring one or another
and panels in later cases involving the same interpretive procedure -
in whatever circuit - following the previous panel's decision. Thus,
Chevron deference appears to depend more than anything else on
whether the first panel to evaluate a particular interpretive procedure
favors Mead-style factors or Barnhart-style factors.
Second, rather than selecting an analysis, some courts simply
avoid taking a firm position on Chevron deference. 17 Because courts
are insecure about Mead, many grant lower-level Skidmore deference
in addition to or in lieu of Chevron deference. Thus, courts engage in
Mead-induced Chevron avoidance. Of course, courts have indulged in
Chevron avoidance for as long as there has been Chevron deference.
Courts (including the Supreme Court) have refrained from expressly
determining whether interpretations of which they approved were
"reasonable" under Chevron, "persuasive" under Skidmore, "correct"
as a matter of statutory construction, all, some, or one of the above.18
After Mead, courts have more reason than ever to avoid committing to
Chevron deference.
These cases, which provide the most overt indication of
uncertainty about Chevron deference after Mead, pack a punch that
even Justice Scalia did not fully anticipate. While Chevron deference
means that an agency, not a court, exercises interpretive control,
Skidmore deference means just the opposite. When a court declines to
grant Chevron deference exclusively or at all, and grants Skidmore
deference as well or instead, it sends a mixed message to the agency
15. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230, 232.
16. 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 416, 426 (1999) (stating that, while
"clear" that Chevron provides the relevant analytical framework, the statutory meaning was "not
obvious" as a "matter of plain meaning," and thus the agency's interpretation was not only
reasonable but "the more appropriate one" in the statutory context).
1446 [Vol. 58:5:1443
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about who retains interpretive control and whether it would be willing
to accept a new agency interpretation in the future. Although the
Court decided at the end of last Term that courts are not prevented as
a legal matter from accepting new agency interpretations if adopted
through Chevron-worthy procedures, courts still might reject new
interpretations as a practical matter. 19 As a consequence, agencies
might find that Chevron avoidance reduces their ability to adapt new
interpretations to changed circumstances. This result is more than a
little ironic. Agencies with congressionally-authorized, notice-and-
comment rulemaking authority may have to use such authority if they
want Chevron deference, though Mead disclaims the need to do so. 20
Agencies with other, arguably comparable, lawmaking authority may
have to accept Skidmore deference and reduced policymaking
flexibility, though Mead disclaims that intention as well.21
Finally, in addition to confusing courts on whether Chevron
deference applies to interpretations issued through informal
procedures, Mead has complicated judicial review of agency action by
insinuating itself where it really does not belong.22 Some courts use
the decision to address the general question whether an agency
possesses delegated authority to issue interpretations at all, rather
than the specific question whether an agency possesses delegated
authority to issue interpretations with the force of law. In particular,
they use Mead to address the general question whether agencies
possess delegated authority to issue interpretations determining the
limits of their own authority, even through notice-and-comment
rulemaking. On the one hand, this is a sort of ingenious use of Mead
to resolve one of the perennial puzzles of Chevron lore. Courts and
scholars have long debated whether Chevron deference extends to
jurisdictional questions. 23 On the other, it disregards what little
guidance Mead provides on the significance of notice-and-comment
rulemaking for Chevron deference. Assuming the lower courts are
justified in ignoring Mead on this point, they still get Mead a bit
backwards. They read the decision as relevant to determining when
an explicit delegation of interpretive authority is necessary, while the
19. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S.Ct. 2688, 2691
(2005) (holding that prior judicial interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision does not
preclude Chevron deference to a subsequent agency interpretation).
20. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 (stating that "the want of [notice-and-comment rulemaking]
here does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even
when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded").
21. See id.
22. See infra Part II.C.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 185-189.
2005] 1447
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case was intended to address when an implicit one is present. But
Mead cannot help decide when the absence of an express delegation of
interpretive authority is fatal to Chevron deference. And reading the
decision as pertinent on this issue cannot help us understand when
the evidence of an implicit delegation of interpretive authority is
sufficient for Chevron deference.
Recognizing that Mead generates uncertainty and confusion
among lower courts, this Article considers where to go from here.24 It
briefly considers Justice Breyer's recent attempt in National Cable &
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services to clarify
Mead.25 Justice Breyer's effort is significant because it acknowledges
the confusion that Mead has wrought. Unfortunately, Justice Breyer
does not provide a cure. Rather, he states a proposition evident in
Mead itself, that relatively formal procedures are not "necessary" for
Chevron deference. And he provides no additional guidance, beyond
an oblique reference to two possible examples, about which less formal
procedures might qualify.26 Thus, Justice Breyer does little to clarify
the core confusion that Mead creates.
Furthermore, Justice Breyer raises a complexity not present in
Mead itself - that the exercise of notice-and-comment rulemaking
authority is not "sufficient" for an agency interpretation to command
Chevron deference in cases involving "unusually basic legal
question[s]." 27 Justice Breyer did not explain what he meant by
"unusually basic legal questions," which is worrisome enough. Could
he have meant scope-of-authority or jurisdictional questions of the sort
that some lower courts have confronted in the wake of Mead? It would
be interesting to identify a special condition on or a special exception
to Chevron deference for such questions. But it would be difficult to
attribute that exception to Mead, even if the exception is justified. At
any rate, Justice Breyer does not address here the status of
procedures less formal than notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Justice Scalia's proposal to stem the confusion is to jettison
both Mead and Skidmore. In Justice Scalia's view, Chevron deference
should turn only on whether the agency has issued an "authoritative"
interpretation of the statute. 28 Furthermore, judicial deference should
be an all-or-nothing proposition - either a court should defer under
Chevron or it should not; he rejects the middle position of Skidmore.29
24. See infra Part III.
25. 125 S.Ct. 2688, 2712 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); see discussion infra Part III.A.
26. See Brand X, 125 S.Ct. at 2712 (Breyer, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 2713 (Breyer, J., concurring).
28. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1448 [Vol. 58:5:1443
HeinOnline  -- 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1448 2005
MEAD HAS MUDDLED
By eliminating Mead and Skidmore, Justice Scalia's solution
simplifies judicial review of agency action.
Justice Scalia's proposal also has a larger theoretical
advantage. It promotes political accountability of agency action. It
removes from judicial control and remits to presidential control all
authoritative agency interpretations, not just those rendered through
certain procedures. And, by placing the interpretive role in
administrative rather than judicial hands, it allows agency
interpretations to evolve as presidential administrations and
executive priorities change. In these ways, Justice Scalia's proposal
enhances the political responsiveness of agency action, which, he
claims, is what Congress intends and what Chevron recognizes. 30
For all its strengths, Justice Scalia's proposal neglects an
important point. 31  "Authoritative" positions have never been
considered sufficiently law-like to comport with our constitutional
structure. Even if such positions are subject to political
accountability, political accountability alone does not adequately
discipline the exercise of governmental lawmaking authority. Rather,
procedural formality also is necessary to guard against, among other
things, even the "authoritative" production of unfair, inconsistent, or
arbitrary law. Procedural formality, whether imposed under
constitutional law or administrative law, always has been a necessary
feature of governmental legitimacy.
Because Justice Scalia's proposal eschews particular
procedural formality, it also ignores a corollary: All procedures are not
created equal. At one end of the spectrum, notice-and-comment
rulemaking guarantees formalities that mimic the legislative process
(and then some). Thus, notice-and-comment rulemaking best ensures
the transparency, deliberation, and consistency that produce fair and
reasonable laws. On the other end, "policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines" guarantee no such
formalities. 32 Because all procedures are not created equal, courts
should not treat all resulting interpretations as equal. Rather, they
should, as the Mead Court intended, "tailor deference to variety."33
If all procedures are not equal, however, neither is it true that
the difference among procedures is so wide as to make all informal
procedures suspect. Some have argued that courts should restrict
Chevron deference to notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal
30. Id. at 244 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. See infra Part III.B.
32. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
33. Mead, 533 U.S. at 236.
2005] 1449
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adjudication. 34  This Article seeks to understand the Court's
theoretical justification for leaving open the possibility that courts
might extend Chevron deference to some less formal arrangement. It
posits that Mead is best read as promoting judicial minimalism or
functionalism in the service of congressional delegation. 35 Mead
reflects the Court's reluctance to second-guess Congress in
establishing regulatory regimes - the same concern that underlies the
Court's refusal to enforce the nondelegation doctrine. More
specifically, Mead can be understood as giving Congress room to
create procedures that are more flexible and efficient than notice-and-
comment rulemaking, which is notoriously ossifying.
Yet we must be careful not to read Mead as giving Congress too
much room.3 6 Congress should not have unfettered discretion to
tinker with the procedures for lawmaking, as the Court has from time
to time recognized. Specifically, Congress should not have unlimited
authority to invent procedures for administrative lawmaking that
promote less accountability and tolerate more arbitrariness than we
have come to accept. If Mead allows Congress (or agencies) unduly to
erode the procedures for administrative lawmaking, we ought to be
concerned. We might, on this basis, argue for a revision of Mead that
restricts Chevron deference, and hence the force of law, to the fruits of
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.
This Article ultimately concludes that such unmitigated
formalism is neither necessary nor wise. We instead should afford
Congress or agencies a little leeway to create administrative
lawmaking procedures beyond trial-type or paper hearings but require
that those procedures adhere to certain specified limits - in particular,
that the resulting policy is transparent, rational, and binding.
Interestingly, we can reach this result through a narrow reading of
Mead and Barnhart.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes Mead and
Barnhart. Part II discusses the treatment of those cases in the courts
of appeals, discerning three different patterns. Section A
demonstrates that courts have alternated between Mead-type analysis
and Barnhart-type analysis to evaluate whether Chevron deference
extends to interpretations issued through informal procedures.
34. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 884-85
(2001) (arguing that Chevron deference should be restricted to legislative rules and binding
adjudications); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 541-44 (2003) (arguing that Mead should have
established a preference for notice-and-comment rulemaking).
35. See infra Part III.C.
36. See id.
1450 [Vol. 58:5:1443
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Section B shows that some courts have avoided clearly extending
Chevron deference, granting Skidmore deference instead or as well,
and potentially reducing agency flexibility to offer new interpretations
in the future. Section C shows that courts have used Mead for a
purpose broader than intended, to address the question of agency
jurisdiction, disregarding Mead's basic point and inverting the case in
the process. Part III reevaluates Mead and Barnhart, proposing a
reconciliation that is justified in theory and workable in practice.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: MEAD AND BARNHART
To examine how the lower courts have handled Mead, it is
necessary to discuss Mead and its progeny, Barnhart. Mead involved
the question whether Chevron deference applies to a U.S. Customs
Service ruling letter that specified the tariff classification for a
particular imported product under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of
the United States.37 More specifically, the Customs ruling letter
classified imported day planners, three-ring binders with a small
space for daily entries, as "diaries" that are "bound" for tariff
purposes. 38 This classification represented a change in prior practice
and resulted in an increase in taxable status.39 The Federal Circuit
had withheld Chevron deference from the ruling letter because such
letters, not preceded by notice-and-comment rulemaking, "do not carry
the force of law" and "are not, like regulations, intended to clarify the
rights and obligations of importers beyond the specific case under
review."40  The court of appeals denied any deference to the ruling
letter whatsoever and interpreted the statute independently. 41
The Supreme Court, Justice Souter writing, agreed that ruling
letters are not entitled to Chevron deference, though it preserved the
possibility that ruling letters might earn Skidmore deference
instead.42 The Court held that Chevron deference applies only when it
is
apparent from the agency's generally conferred authority and other statutory
circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force
of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law,
even one about which Congress did not actually have an intent as to a particular result,
37. Mead, 533 U.S at 221.
38. Id. at 224.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 226.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 227.
2005] 1451
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and the agency exercises such authority.43 The Court acknowledged
that an express grant of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication authority is "a very good indicator of delegation meriting
Chevron treatment" because "[i]t is fair to assume generally that
Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law
when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure
tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a
pronouncement of such force."44 The Court observed, however, that
"the want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we have
sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such
administrative formality was required and none was afforded."45
Although the lack of notice-and-comment rulemaking authority
was not fatal to Chevron deference for Customs ruling letters, the
Court found that other considerations were. First, nothing in the
statute conveyed a congressional intent to authorize Customs to issue
ruling letters with the force of law.46 The statute made reference to
"binding rulings," but this reference did not "bespeak the legislative
type of activity that naturally binds more than the parties to the
ruling."47  Ruling letters might be precedential, but "precedential
value alone does not add up to Chevron entitlement."48 Furthermore,
ruling letters are not clearly precedential (and certainly not binding)
because they are subject to independent review and displacement by
the Court of International Trade ("CIT'). 49
Second, Customs did not "ever set out with a lawmaking
pretense in mind when it undertook to make classifications like
these. '50 As the Court observed, the "treatment by the agency makes
it clear that a letter's binding character stops short of third parties;
Customs has regarded a classification as conclusive only between
itself and the importer to whom it was issued. '51 Indeed, the agency's
practice in issuing such letters belies any indication that they are
intended to carry the force of law. The letters come from 46 different
Customs offices at a rate of 10,000-15,000 per year.52 The Court was
not persuaded by the fact that the ruling letter at issue in the case
43. Id. at 229 (internal quotations omitted).
44. Id. at 230.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 232.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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was generated by Customs Headquarters, rather than one of the
myriad field offices, or that it contained a reasoned explanation for its
classification. 53 This one good example was not evidence of a "more
potent delegation" to Headquarters to issue ruling letters with the
force of law.54 The Court therefore found rulings letters "beyond the
Chevron pale" and analogous to 'interpretations contained in policy
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines."'55
But, unlike the Federal Circuit, the Court held that the letters
could merit "some" deference. 56 Specifically, the Court stated that
"Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore's holding that an agency's
interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form, given the
'specialized experience and broader investigations and information'
available to the agency, and given the value of uniformity in its
administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law
requires."57 Because Skidmore deference might still apply, the Court
remanded the case to the Federal Circuit or the CIT for a
determination of whether the letter ruling had the "power to
persuade."58
Justice Scalia dissented, contending the majority's decision was
"neither sound in principle nor sustainable in practice." 59  As to
principle, Justice Scalia remarked that Mead altered the law of
judicial review of agency action, converting Chevron's presumption of
agency discretion to resolve statutory ambiguities into "a presumption
that agency discretion does not exist unless the statute, expressly or
impliedly says so."60 And when the statute does not say so, Mead
"resurrects, in full force, the pre-Chevron doctrine of Skidmore
deference, whereby '[t]he fair measure of deference to an agency
administering its own statute ... varie[s] with circumstances."' 61
Thus, Justice Scalia commented, "the Court has largely replaced
Chevron ... with that test most beloved by a court unwilling to be
held to rules (and most feared by litigants who want to know what to
expect): th'ol' 'totality of the circumstances' test."62  Justice Scalia
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 234 (quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)).
58. Id. at 235, 238-39.
59. Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 240 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 228 (majority opinion)).
62. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2005] 1453
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rejected this test as inconsistent with Chevron and judicial review of
agency action.
In adhering to Chevron for less formal letter rulings, Justice
Scalia disclaimed any connection between "the formality of procedure
and the power of an entity administering the procedure to resolve
authoritatively questions of law."63 The purpose of procedures like
formal adjudication, he said, is to create a record for review of facts
rather than to confer the power definitively to resolve questions of
law.64 Furthermore, he noted that agencies are free to select among
procedures, even to "mak[e] law as they implement their program (not
necessarily) through formal adjudication."65 It is likely, he continued,
that Congress intends for agencies to "accord the administrators or
that agency, and their successors, the flexibility of interpreting the
ambiguous statute now one way, and later another."66 It cannot be,
then, that Congress intends "when an agency chooses [informal] case-
by-case administration, to eliminate all future agency discretion by
having that same ambiguity resolved authoritatively (and forever) by
courts."67 But, Justice Scalia claimed, the majority's decision leads to
just that result.68
In addition to theoretical flaws, Justice Scalia contended that
the majority's decision had practical defects. First and foremost, he
maintained that the decision would cause "protracted confusion"
because of the "utter flabbiness of the Court's criterion." 69 The opinion
listed, in addition to notice-and-comment rulemaking or comparable
procedural formality, "a grab bag of other factors" that indicate
Chevron-worthiness. 70 "It is hard to know," he stated, "what the lower
courts are to make of today's guidance." 71
Second, Justice Scalia argued that the decision would cause "an
artificially induced increase in informal rulemaking" because such
rulemaking and formal adjudication "are the only more-or-less safe
harbors from the storm that the Court has unleashed."72
Furthermore, he stated that the Court's de facto rulemaking
requirement would create a perverse result because agencies are
63. Id. at 243 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. Id at 244. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
67. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 58:5:14431454
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entitled to Chevron-style deference when issuing interpretations of
their own rules: "Agencies will now have high incentive to rush out
barebones, ambiguous rules construing statutory ambiguities, which
they can then in turn clarify through informal rulings entitled to
judicial respect. '7 3
"Worst of all," Justice Scalia stated, the Court's decision would
promote "ossification of large parts of our statutory law. '74  By
removing informal agency interpretations from the Chevron regime,
Mead reassigns those interpretations to judicial control. That is
because "Skidmore deference gives the agency's current position some
vague and uncertain amount of respect, but it does not, like Chevron,
leave the matter within the control of the Executive Branch for the
future."75  Furthermore, "once the court has spoken, it becomes
unlawful for the agency to take a contradictory position; the statute
now says what the court prescribed."76  The resulting statutory
"ossification" is particularly troubling when it "occurs simply because
of an agency's failure to act by rulemaking (rather than informal
adjudication) before the issue is presented to the courts."77 Nor, said
Justice Scalia, can an agency prevent the ossification simply by re-
promulgating its interpretation through notice-and-comment
rulemaking. 78 Courts are not at liberty to abdicate, and agencies do
not possess authority to override, the judicial power once exercised. 79
Finally, Justice Scalia faulted the majority's decision for
"breathing new life into the anachronism of Skidmore."80 Skidmore,
which establishes "a sliding scale of deference" based on multiple
factors, "is a recipe for uncertainty, unpredictability and endless
litigation."81  Because Mead pushes an untold number of agency
interpretations into the Skidmore box, it is simply "irresponsible."8 2
In the end, Justice Scalia argued that the Customs ruling letter
was entitled to Chevron deference. Under his test, the ruling letter
"represents the authoritative view of the agency."8 3 But even under
the majority's test, Justice Scalia stated that the Customs ruling letter
73. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 258 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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was entitled to Chevron deference because it was issued by the agency
head and therefore indistinguishable from a determination of the
Comptroller of the Currency, to whom the Court earlier had extended
Chevron deference.8 4
The very next Term, the Court had to apply Mead in Barnhart
v. Walton.8 5 Barnhart concerned the issue whether Chevron deference
applied to a Social Security Administration ("SSA") interpretation of
the Social Security Act.8 6  The agency originally issued the
interpretation in a 1957 OASI Disability Insurance Letter, a 1965
Disability Insurance State Manual, and a 1982 Social Security
Ruling.8 7 In 2001, it issued the same interpretation through notice-
and-comment rulemaking.88 The Court, Justice Breyer writing, held
that the interpretation was entitled to Chevron deference. It first
found that the statute "does not unambiguously forbid the agency's
regulation," that the agency's interpretation was "permissible"
because that interpretation comported with the statute's "basic
objectives," and that the interpretation was evidently acceptable to
Congress, which had repeatedly reenacted the relevant statutory
provisions without change.8 9 It then rejected the argument that the
agency's regulation was not entitled to Chevron deference because the
regulation was recently promulgated, "perhaps in response to this
litigation," reasoning that it "previously [had] rejected similar
arguments."90
The Court did not stop there. It went on to consider the
agency's interpretation as if it had never been issued through notice-
and-comment rulemaking. It observed that the agency's interpretation
was "longstanding" and that the Court normally "accord[s] particular
deference to an agency interpretation of 'longstanding' duration."91
Furthermore, it stated that although the interpretation was originally
rendered through procedures less formal than notice-and-comment
rulemaking, such informality "does not automatically deprive that
interpretation of the judicial deference otherwise its due."92 Under
Mead, the Court said, "whether a court should give such deference
84. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
86. Id. at 217.
87. Id. at 219-20.
88. Id. at 217.
89. Id. at 218-20.
90. Id. at 221.
91. Id. at 219.
92. Id. at 221.
[Vol. 58:5:14431456
HeinOnline  -- 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1456 2005
MEAD HAS MUDDLED
depends in significant part upon the interpretive method used and the
nature of the question at issue."93 It determined that, in this case,
the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the
importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that
administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a
long period of time all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through
which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation here at issue.
9 4
On all these grounds, the Court upheld the interpretation. 95
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment on this issue. For
him, Chevron deference was justified because the SSA's interpretation
ultimately had emerged from notice-and-comment rulemaking.96 He
rejected the idea that "particular deference is owed to an agency
interpretation of longstanding duration. ' 97 Because modern law,
including Chevron, accepts the notion that there is more than one
permissible meaning for a statutory ambiguity, agencies may "move
from one [meaning] to another."98 He continued, "so long as the most
recent interpretation is reasonable its antiquity should make no
difference." 99  He added that, if the Court cared to consider the
informal agency pronouncements that predated the notice-and-
comment rulemaking (and some of which pre-dated congressional
acquiescence), it "should state why those interpretations were
authoritative enough (or whatever-else-enough Mead requires) to
qualify for deference."'100
II. MEAD IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
After Mead and Barnhart, lower courts generally understand
that Chevron deference applies only if Congress delegates, and the
agency exercises, authority to issue interpretations with the force of
law. This Part demonstrates that courts lose focus thereafter. As
Section A shows, courts alternate between Mead-style analysis and
Barnhart-style analysis to determine whether an agency issued an
interpretation with the force of law. As Section B documents, some
courts are so uncertain about which analysis applies that they avoid
deciding and grant Skidmore deference in addition to or in lieu of
93. Id. at 222.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 226 (Scalia, J., concurring).
97. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (quotations omitted).
98. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
99. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 227 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Chevron deference to agency interpretations contained in
nonconventional formats. As Section C reveals, some courts read too
much into Mead and use it for a broader purpose than intended.
A. Analytical Divergence
After Mead, courts diverge as to what evidence demonstrates
that Congress intended an agency to issue an interpretation with the
force of law and that the agency exercised its authority to do so.101 As
101. Courts generally do not diverge on the analysis for interpretations issued through
procedures presumptively entitled to Chevron deference, such as notice-and-comment
rulemaking. See, e.g., BCCA Appeal Group v. EPA, 355 F.3d 817, 825 (5th Cir. 2004); Coke v.
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 376 F.3d 118, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2004); Shotz v. City of Plantation,
344 F.3d 1161, 1179 (11th Cir. 2003); BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. MCIMetro Access
Transmission Servs., Inc., 317 F.3d 1270, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003); Stroup v. Barnhart, 327 F.3d
1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003); N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Group v. Whitman, 321 F.3d 316, 328-
29 (2d Cir. 2003); Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 272 F.3d 1155, 1165
(9th Cir. 2001).
In addition, courts generally do not diverge on the analysis for interpretations contained in
formats traditionally excluded from Chevron deference, such as: (1) agency manuals, handbooks,
and other internal documents, see Tennessee Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Wells, 371 F.3d 342, 351
(6th Cir. 2004) (agency annual report); Colorado v. Sunoco, Inc., 337 F.3d 1233, 1243 (10th Cir.
2003) (agency reports and memoranda); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Servs., 332 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (peer review organization manual); Butterbaugh v.
Dep't of Justice, 336 F.3d 1332, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (agency personnel manual); James v.
Von Zemenszky, 301 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (agency directive and handbook); Am.
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 262 F.3d 649, 658 n.10 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal agency
memoranda), and (2) litigating positions, see NRDC v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 201 (2d Cir.
2004) (interpretation that "followed the petitioner's suits in both this court and the district
court"); In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc., 371 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2004) ( "the position taken by
the SEC in its brief'); Chao v. Russell P. Le Frois Builder, Inc., 291 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2002)
(interpretation "expressed only as a position in litigation"); Ala. Power Co. v. U.S. Dep't of
Energy, 307 F.3d 1300, 1312-13 (11th 2002) (interpretation in settlement agreement); Pool Co. v.
Cooper, 274 F.3d 173, 179 n.3 (5th Cir. 2001) (interpretation advanced in "litigation briefs");
Matz v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 265 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2001)
(interpretation in amicus brief).
Courts also generally agree on the analysis for interpretations contained in Customs
classification rulings, denied Chevron deference in Mead, and procedurally-analogous IRS
Revenue rulings. See Structural Indus., Inc. v. United States, 356 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (Customs classification ruling); Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. United States, 379 F.3d 1303,
1307 (2004) (IRS revenue procedure); Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir.
2004) (IRS revenue ruling); Park B. Smith, Ltd. v. United States, 347 F.3d 922, 925 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (Customs classification ruling); Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 347 F.3d 173, 181 (6th
Cir. 2003) (IRS revenue ruling); O'Shaughnessy v. Comm'r, 332 F.3d 1125, 1130-31 (8th Cir.
2003) (IRS revenue ruling); Omohundro v. United States, 300 F.3d 1065, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2002)
(IRS revenue ruling); Rocknel Fastener, Inc. v. United States, 267 F.3d 1354, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (Customs classification ruling). Cf. Rubie's Costume Co. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1350,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (debating whether Mead withholds Chevron deference from Customs
classification rulings even if issued through notice-and-comment rulemaking and concluding that
it does); Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 264 F.3d 1126, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(same).
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described below, some courts concentrate on whether an
interpretation binds more than the parties at hand; some broaden this
analysis to ask whether, in addition to binding effect, the
interpretation reflects public participation; some limit their focus to
whether an agency interpretation reflects careful consideration; and
some expand this focus, weighing careful consideration along with
agency expertise and statutory complexity.
At a more general level, the courts can be sorted into two
groups: those that consider Mead-inspired factors and those that
consider Barnhart-inspired factors. Some courts consider whether an
interpretation reflects binding effect, either alone or together with
deliberation (via public participation) - the factor that Mead made
determinative. Other courts consider whether an agency
interpretation reflects careful consideration, either alone or together
with agency expertise and statutory complexity - the factor that
Barnhart made relevant. The problem, as discussed below, is that
these tests are not necessarily equivalent. Nor do the courts generally
acknowledge that they have chosen one over another. As a result,
Chevron deference seems to turn more on which test a court prefers
than on which procedure an agency uses.
Consider first the cases in which courts have selected
Barnhart-style analysis to evaluate whether a particular interpretive
procedure is entitled to Chevron deference. Nowhere is this more
evident than in the one place where the circuits have split over the
appropriate level of deference due one particular interpretive
procedure: Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") Statements of
Policy. Although the circuits have differed in their conclusions, they
have agreed on the basic analysis. Each examines whether HUD
Statements of Policy reflect "careful consideration" or require "agency
expertise," as Barnhart contemplated. 102 None discusses whether
those documents are binding, as Mead emphasized. 10 3
For example, in Schuetz v. Banc One Mortgage Corp., the Ninth
Circuit held that the 2001 HUD Statement of Policy was entitled to
Chevron deference based on the Barnhart factors. 10 4 HUD Statements
of Policy interpret ambiguous provisions of the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act. 10 5 The 1999 and 2001 Statements of Policy, for
instance, specifically determined whether the statute permits
mortgage brokers to charge home buyers certain real estate
102. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222.
103. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230, 232.
104. 292 F.3d 1004, 1011-13 (9th Cir. 2002).
105. 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (2005).
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settlement fees which had been the subject of litigation.1 6 HUD
Statements of Policy do not emanate from notice-and-comment
rulemaking but are published in the Federal Register. The Ninth
Circuit, finding Chevron deference appropriate, reasoned that
"Congress authorized the Department to interpret [the statute], HUD
has responsibility for enforcing the statute, and it has expertise in the
home mortgage lending industry."'0 7
The Seventh Circuit also followed Barnhart-style analysis, but
in Krzalic v. Republic Title Co.,' 08 the court held that the 2001 HUD
Statement of Policy was not entitled to Chevron deference. Using the
same factors, the court found that an agency must use "something
more formal, more deliberative, than a simple announcement."'' 0 9 It
concluded that the 2001 Statement of Policy did not satisfy this
requirement, noting that, "[o]ne fine day the policy statement simply
appeared in the Federal Register. No public process preceded it."110
The court saw no "discussion," "no reason," "no evidence or
interpretive methodology," and "no abuse pointed to that might justify
the contorted interpretation urged by HUD.""'
The Second Circuit disagreed and held that the 2001
Statement of Policy was entitled to Chevron deference. In Kruse v.
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., the Second Circuit employed a
Barnhart-based analysis that "weigh[ed]" several factors." 2 The court
stated that the Statement of Policy "arose out of the 'careful
consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of
time."'13 It did not believe, as did the Seventh Circuit, that the
Statement of Policy simply appeared in the Federal Register. 1 4
Rather, the court noted that HUD wrote the Statement of Policy in
response to an earlier decision in which the Seventh Circuit had
106. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Statement of Policy 2001-1: Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act Statement of Policy 1999-1 Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage
Brokers, 64 Fed. Reg. 10,080 (Mar. 1, 1999) (resolving issue of lender payments at behest of
Conference Report on the Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development,
and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act); Clarification of Policy 1999-1 Regarding Lender
Payments to Mortgage Brokers, and Guidance Concerning Unearned Fees under Section 8(b), 66
Fed. Reg. 53,052 (Oct. 18, 2001) (resolving lingering questions about lender payments and
unearned fees raised by two court decisions).
107. Schuetz, 292 F.3d at 1013.
108. 314 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2002).
109. Id. at 881. It also found HUD's interpretation inconsistent with the statute, making
Chevron deference, as a technical matter, irrelevant. See id. at 879.
110. Id. at 879.
111. Id.
112. 383 F.3d 49, 61 (2d Cir. 2004).
113. Id. at 60 (quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002)).
114. Id. at 61.
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refused to depart from its own precedent. 15 Because the Statement of
Policy was a targeted response to a judicial decision, the court
recognized "further reason to defer to it."116 Furthermore, the court
affirmed that HUD has particular expertise on real estate settlement
fees and the market for federally related home mortgage loans. 11 7
Citing Barnhart, the court stated that this expertise "bolsters the
argument that we should defer to the Policy Statement."118
These cases demonstrate that the circuits, though disagreeing
on the appropriate level of deference for the 2001 HUD Statement of
Policy, agree on the applicable mode of analysis. Other courts employ
similar Barnhart-based analysis with respect to other informal
procedures. For example, in Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital
v. Thompson, the Third Circuit accorded Chevron deference to an
interpretation contained in Department of Health & Human Services
("HHS") Guidelines because it effectively met the Barnhart test. 119
The policy, challenged as a mere litigating position, was instead rooted
"in regulations and administrative practice" and was well explained in
the Federal Register. 120 Finally, it concerned a complex regulatory
scheme and thus especially implicated the agency's expertise. 121
Of these cases, Krzalik is the most unusual because it
recognized that Mead and Barnhart present a puzzle and an
opportunity for choice. 22 Judge Posner, writing for the majority,
argued that Barnhart merged Chevron and Skidmore, making the
multiple factors from the latter determinative under the former. 123
Judge Easterbrook, concurring, contended that Mead took pains to
distinguish Chevron and Skidmore, maintaining a distinct approach
for each. 124 Mead and Barnhart suggest disparate tests for Chevron
deference, leaving individual panels (even individual judges) simply to
select between them.




119. 297 F.3d 273, 281-82 (3d Cir. 2002).
120. Id. at 281.
121. Id. at 282. The Sixth Circuit also applied Barnhart-style analysis in Hospital Corp. of
Am. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r. 348 F.3d 136, 144-45 (6th Cir. 2003) (granting Chevron deference
to temporary IRS regulations that "were arrived at centrally by the Treasury Department, after
careful consideration").
122. Compare Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 877-79 (7th Cir. 2002) (arguing
that Barnhart conflated Chevron and Skidmore), with id. at 882 (Easterbrook., J., concurring)
(arguing that Mead distinguished Chevron and Skidmore).
123. Id. at 879.
124. Id. at 882 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
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Yet other courts, even within the circuits already discussed,
embrace the alternative Mead-grounded analysis, without expressly so
stating or recognizing the implicit conflict with other panels or judges
in the same circuit. For example, in Wilderness Society v. United
States Fish & Wildlife Service, the Ninth Circuit en banc debated
whether Chevron deference should apply to interpretations contained
in agency permitting decisions, noting that those interpretations
lacked binding effect - a Mead-type consideration. 125 Significantly,
the prior Ninth Circuit panel had extended Chevron deference to the
interpretation. 126 In doing so, the panel exhibited insecurity about
Mead, stating that "[alfter Mead, we are certain of only two things
about the continuum of deference owed to agency decisions: Chevron
provides an example of when Chevron deference applies, and Mead
provides an example of When it does not."127 The panel nevertheless
had accorded Chevron deference to the interpretation because the
permitting decision was made after the public had an opportunity to
comment, was consistent with the agency's Final Plan for the area,
and the Plan was a product of notice-and-comment rulemaking that
"is undoubtedly owed Chevron deference." 128  Additionally, the
permitting decisions complied with the National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA"), and NEPA provides a "relatively formal administrative
procedure tending to foster ... fairness and deliberation." 129
The en banc court reversed because neither the permitting
decision nor the interpretation contained therein had a binding effect
on future parties.1 30 "Applying Mead," the court held, "we conclude
that this case involves only an agency's application of law in a
particular permitting context, and not an interpretation of a statute
that will have the force of law generally for others in similar
circumstances."'1 31  Similarly, the court held that several project-
specific documents, including NEPA-related documents and an
opinion letter from the Department of the Interior's Regional
Solicitor's office, were not entitled to Chevron deference because they
do not "bind the [United States Fish & Wildlife Service] to permit a
125. 316 F.3d 913, rev'd en banc, 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003).
126. Wilderness Socy, 316 F.3d at 922.
127. Id. at 921.
128. Id. at 922.
129. Id.
130. Wilderness Socy, 353 F.3d at 1067-68 (en banc).
131. Id. at 1067 (en banc); see also High Sierra Hikers Ass'n v. Blackwell, 381 F.3d 886, 904
(9th Cir. 2004) ('The Forest Service was not acting with the force of law in this case because it
was granting permits, not acting in a way that would have precedential value for subsequent
parties.").
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similar activity in another wilderness." 132 The court determined that
"[e]ven when considered together, the Special Use Permit and the
underlying documents do not 'bespeak the type of legislative activity
that would naturally bind more than the parties to the ruling."'133
This is the same circuit that had demanded only careful consideration,
while in Barnhart mode, with respect to HUD Statements of Policy.134
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit also has undertaken
varying analyses. In Schneider v. Feinberg, the Second Circuit
extended Chevron deference to an agency interpretation rendered
through an informal procedure because that interpretation had
binding effect.135 Moreover, citing Mead, it stated that the
"touchstone" of Chevron deference is binding effect, not any other
consideration. 136 Because the challenged interpretations applied
"equally to all claimants," the court held that they were entitled to
Chevron deference.1 37  Again, this came from a court that gave
Chevron deference to the non-binding but carefully considered HUD
Statements of Policy.
In sum, courts vacillate between two different modes of
analysis for determining whether Chevron deference applies to
interpretations obtained through nonconventional procedures.
Sometimes a particular court employs Mead-style analysis, and at
other times it uses Barnhart-style analysis. 138 Furthermore, these
132. Wilderness Soc'y, 353 F.3d at 1067 (en banc).
133. Id. (en banc) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 232 (2001)).
134. See Schuetz v. Banc One Mortgage Corp., 292 F.3d 1004, 1011-13 (9th Cir. 2002).
135. 345 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2003).
136. Id. at 143.
137. Id. Among the other courts to have emphasized binding effect are: FEC v. Nat'l Rifle
Ass'n of Am., 254 F.3d 173, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (granting Chevron deference to FEC advisory
opinions that "not only reflect the Commission's considered judgment made pursuant to
congressionally delegated lawmaking authority, but also have binding legal effect"); Hall v. EPA,
273 F.3d 1146, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 2001) (denying Chevron deference to interpretation contained in
an EPA approval of a state air quality plan ("SIP") because the "SIP's reach extends only to those
it directly regulates, and does not have 'force of law' constituting binding precedent for future
SIP revisions"). Cf. Pesquera Mares Australes LTDA v. United States, 266 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (granting Chevron deference to interpretations contained in Department of Commerce
anti-dumping determinations because those "interpretations are embodied in rulings that are
given precedential effect"). Note, however, that these cases are pre-Barnhart.
138. Some courts have applied little analysis at all, asking only whether Congress gave an
agency general implementation authority without further inquiring whether Congress intended
the agency to use a particular procedure to discharge such authority. See Heimmermann v. First
Union Mortgage Corp., 305 F.3d 1257, 1261-62 (11th Cir. 2002) (granting Chevron deference to
interpretation contained in HUD Statement of Policy because the statute delegates "the power to
issue interpretations," and HUD uses Statements of Policy to discharge that obligation); Am.
Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2001) (granting Chevron deference to
interpretation of Clean Air Act in EPA SIP approval because "EPA has been charged by
Congress with the authority to administer and interpret the Act" and "the EPA's action in this
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analyses are not equivalent, at least not in the way that courts have
understood them. As the dispute between Judge Posner and Judge
Easterbrook demonstrates, careful consideration is worlds apart from
binding effect. Courts that require one but not the other may arrive at
different conclusions about whether a particular informal interpretive
procedure is entitled to Chevron deference. Thus, it is possible to
imagine a real circuit split over whether a particular informal
interpretive procedure is entitled to Chevron deference - not because
the courts disagree on whether a particular procedure is entitled to
Chevron deference, but because they disagree on the prior question of
how to determine whether Chevron deference applies.
What emerges is a sense that courts diverge not only on what
Mead means but also on how it relates to Barnhart. The Supreme
Court has not clarified the relationship between the two decisions,
leaving courts simply to select between them on a case-by-case or
procedure-by-procedure basis often without any acknowledgement
that they are doing so. As a result, Chevron deference appears to
depend more than anything on whether the first panel to consider a
particular interpretive procedure favors the Mead or the Barnhart
test. In other words, Chevron deference seems to vary with the
different analyses that courts choose rather than the different tools
that agencies use. This is far from a satisfactory answer to the
question when Chevron deference applies to interpretations rendered
through informal procedures.
B. Chevron Avoidance
In many cases, the courts express their uncertainty about
Mead by refraining from deciding clearly whether Chevron deference
applies. Instead, they find an easier way out. Some refuse to choose
between Chevron deference and Skidmore deference and simply
determine that lower-level Skidmore deference supports the agency's
interpretation. 139 Others refuse to choose and simply determine that
case was taken in exercise of that authority"). It is worth noting that the Tenth Circuit's decision
in American Wildlands appears to create a thin circuit split with the Third Circuit's decision in
Hall because the former grants deference to an EPA SIP approval while the latter does not.
139. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Wilson N. Jones Mem'l Hosp., 374 F.3d 362,
369 (5th Cir. 2004) (refusing to decide whether Chevron or Skidmore analysis applies to
interpretation contained in Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation audit review order because it
"may be upheld under the less deferential standard set forth in [Skidmore]"); Pronsolino v.
Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1133, 1134-35 (9th 2002) (refusing to decide whether Chevron or
Skidmore analysis applies to interpretation contained in EPA "policy, regulations, and practice"
because the interpretation is "one to which we owe substantial Skidmore deference, at the very
least").
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both Chevron deference and Skidmore deference support the agency's
interpretation. 140 These grounds are more straightforward than
determining whether Congress intended the interpretive procedure to
carry the force of law, and they achieve the same practical result, at
least in the short term: the agency wins. But, as discussed below, the
agency also loses.
Consider an example of Mead-induced Chevron avoidance. In
Community Health Center v. Wilson-Coker, the Second Circuit refused
to decide whether Chevron deference applies to an interpretation of
the Medicaid Act contained in the federal Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services' ("CMS") Rural Health Clinic and Federally
Qualified Health Center Manual. 141 The Second Circuit explained
that "in cases such as this, where a highly expert agency administers
a large and complex regulatory scheme in cooperation with many
other institutional actors, the various possible standards for deference
begin to converge. ' 142  In particular, the court continued, Mead
requires deference to agency interpretations appearing in "format[s]
authorized by Congress for use in issuing 'legislative' rules."143 But
Barnhart requires deference to interpretations,
depending upon to what extent the underlying statute suffers from exposed gaps in its
policies, especially if the statute itself is very complex, as well as on the agency's
expertise in making such policy decisions, the importance of the agency's decisions to
the administration of the statute, and the degree of consideration the agency has given
the relevant issues over time. 144
Furthermore, the court observed that, even if neither Mead nor
Barnhart requires deference, Skidmore permits deference "based
largely on a similar set of concerns: the agency's expertise, the care it
took in reaching its conclusions, the formality with which it
promulgates its interpretations, the consistency of its views over time,
and the ultimate persuasiveness of its arguments."'145 Because these
tests evince no clear demarcations, the court avoided determining "the
140. See, e.g., Cmty. Health Ctr. v. Wilson-Coker, 311 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2002) (refusing
to decide whether Chevron or Skidmore analysis applies to interpretation contained in Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services manual because interpretation deserves "considerable
deference, whether under Chevron or otherwise"); Old Ben Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs, 292 F.3d 533, 542 (7th Cir. 2002) (refusing to decide whether Chevron
or Skidmore analysis applies to interpretation articulated by Department of Labor and
encapsulated in Benefits Review Board determination because the interpretation is "both
reasonable and persuasive").
141. Cmty. Health Ctr., 311 F.3d at 132.
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exact molecular weight of deference we accord to the CMS's
position." 146
The court instead accorded CMS's interpretation "considerable
deference, whether under Chevron or otherwise."147 In so doing, the
court noted, as the Supreme Court had previously done, that even
CMS interpretations contained in letters from regional administrators
warrant "respectful consideration."148 Although such interpretations
are highly informal, they deserve substantial weight because "CMS
regional staff reviews State plans and amendments, discusses any
issues with the Medicaid agency, and consults with central office staff
on questions regarding application of Federal Policy."1 49 Moreover,
the court stated that "[w]e take care not lightly to disrupt the
informed judgments of those who must labor daily in the minefield of
often arcane policy, especially given the substantive complexities of
the Medicaid statute.' 5 °
Community Health Center illustrates why courts engage in
Chevron avoidance. After Mead, courts are uncertain whether
interpretations contained in formats like the CMS manual are entitled
to Chevron deference or even which analytical framework applies. As
a result, they sidestep the question. In this case, the court upheld the
interpretation as either "reasonable" or "persuasive."' 5' Not all courts
respond to Mead in this fashion; some courts uphold interpretations as
at least "persuasive."152  But the impulse is identical. Because
agencies win under any standard, the particular degree of deference
makes little apparent difference.
This impulse is problematic because the degree of deference
may make a difference in the long run. When an agency commands
Chevron deference, it retains the ability to change its position in the
future.1 53 Thus, an agency retains the ability to adapt open-ended
statutory terms to evolving technologies or administrative priorities.
When an agency wins as a result of Skidmore deference, it may lose
this flexibility because the court rather than the agency retains
146. Id. at 137-38.





152. See supra note 140.
153. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in
Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1301 (2002) ("[A]pplying the incorporation
theory of precedent to interpretive rulings means that most judicial challenges to agency
decisions will preclude the agency from ever adopting its own interpretation of a statute.").
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interpretive control. 154  Skidmore deference, though phrased as
"deference," actually allocates interpretive control to courts. 155
One might think that, as a practical matter, once courts
exercise interpretive control, they are less likely to yield such control
in the future.156 This is especially true if, in the course of deciding
that an interpretation is not merely "reasonable" but "persuasive," a
court convinces itself that the interpretation is best. In any event, the
agency is left to guess at the extent to which the court has foreclosed
future departures. Faced with uncertainty about the court's posture
toward the prior interpretation, the agency might refrain from offering
any subsequent interpretation for fear the court would find it patently
"unreasonable" or inconsistent with the statute.
Chevron avoidance exaggerates the problem. Take a decision
to grant at least Skidmore deference. What precisely is the message
there? The agency is left to guess whether the court has foreclosed the
possibility of future departures or simply dodged the Chevron bullet.
The same holds for a decision to grant both Chevron and Skidmore
deference. The agency is forced to guess whether the court is
amenable to change; if an interpretation is acceptable under either
analysis, the interpretation may be the best or simply good enough for
the court to avoid taking a position on the stronger-form Chevron
deference. Chevron avoidance sends unclear or conflicting signals.
While an agency can measure the degree of the court's ambivalence
toward Chevron deference after Mead, it cannot evaluate the degree of
the court's commitment to the current interpretation.
Of course, these are only practical impediments to subsequent
agency interpretation. The Supreme Court decided last Term that
prior judicial precedent and stare decisis principles do not prevent
courts from accepting subsequent agency interpretations. 157 Thus,
154. See id. at 1302-03; William S. Jordan, III, Judicial Review of Informal Statutory
Interpretations: The Answer is Chevron Step Two, Not Christensen or Mead, 54 ADMIN. L. REV.
719, 722-25 (2002) (arguing that once a court chooses a meaning in reliance on agency informal
adjudication, agency may not be able to depart even through use of congressionally-specified
procedures such as notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication).
155. See Bamberger, supra note 153, at 1300 (noting that courts make the interpretive
judgment under a Skidmore regime). In this respect, the phrase Skidmore "deference" is
misleading. A court granting Skidmore deference does not actually relinquish interpretive power
to the agency but recognizes the agency as a kind of expert witness, particularly useful in
rendering its own interpretive judgment.
156. Id.
157. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S.Ct. 2688, 2696-
2712 (2005). Brand X concerned a prior judicial interpretation issued in the absence of any
agency interpretation, rather than one issued in the presence of an agency interpretation that
merits Skidmore deference and not Chevron deference. Id. But the holding in Brand X should
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Chevron avoidance does not require courts as a legal matter from
accepting new agency interpretations. Consequently, it does not
compel an agency to forego changes.
Although it is possible to overstate the effect of practical
impediments, we still have reason to worry. To the extent that
Chevron avoidance convinces agencies to forego changes, it has the
effect of reducing their maneuvering space. Agencies may become
dissuaded from changing course if they fail to receive Chevron
deference, even after issuing interpretations in ways that plausibly
entitle them to Chevron deference. To the extent that Mead offers
courts more reason than ever to refuse to grant Chevron deference
outright, it is cause for concern.
Because agencies cannot be certain as to how future courts may
react as a practical matter to subsequent interpretations, they are left
with one option: rushing to rulemaking. As Justice Scalia quipped,
"[b]uy stock in the GPO."158  Mead makes clear that agencies can
command Chevron deference by invoking notice-and-comment
rulemaking where congressionally authorized to do so.159 That is,
notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication are Mead
"safe harbor[s]."1 60 Mead purportedly does not require agencies to use
notice-and-comment rulemaking power, and it would be ironic if lower
court interpretations effectively accomplished that result.1 61 It also
would be ironic if lower court interpretations deprived the fruits of
notice-and-comment rulemaking of Chevron deference because such
fruits come after an interpretation that prompted Chevron avoidance.
Perhaps one could defend these results - or rather, defend a revision
of Mead to require that agencies use notice-and-comment rulemaking
when congressionally authorized if they want to command Chevron
deference and retain interpretive flexibility. That is not, however,
what the Court said it intended. It said that it wanted to tailor
Chevron deference to the various procedures that agencies use, not the
other way around. 162
apply to the latter as well as the former. Cf. Bamberger, supra note 153, at 1298-1301 (noting
that judicial interpretation occurs and stare decisis attaches in both circumstances).
158. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 246 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Bamberger, supra note 153, at 1303 ("When an agency believes an issue is important enough
that it wishes its policy choices to command deference in the courts, it must go through the more
formal notice-and-comment rulemaking or adjudicative hoops necessary to create policy with the
force of law.").
159. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230.
160. Id. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 231 (stating that "we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even
when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded").
162. Id. at 236 (contending that Mead "tailor[s] deference to variety").
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Moreover, sometimes agencies are not congressionally
authorized to issue interpretations through notice-and-comment
rulemaking. And Mead makes clear that agencies cannot shoehorn
themselves into Chevron deference by voluntarily adopting procedures
that Congress has not authorized. 63 Such agencies are left with
whatever procedures Congress has authorized. If those procedures sit
in the twilight zone that Mead apparently creates, agencies might find
that they are consigned to Skidmore deference and reduced
interpretive flexibility despite their best efforts.
In sum, lower courts have not made progress toward answering
the question when an interpretation generated through an informal
procedure is entitled to Chevron deference because they have chosen
to avoid the question. Worse, they may have converted their very
uncertainty into reduced agency flexibility. Even Justice Scalia did
not fully imagine this result.
C. Jurisdictional Questions and Explicit Delegations
In addition to approaching Mead in an uncertain fashion, some
lower courts employ Mead for purposes broader than intended. As
described below, they use Mead to address the general question
whether an agency has delegated authority to issue interpretations at
all, rather than the specific question whether an agency has delegated
authority to issue interpretations with the force of law. In particular,
they use Mead to address the general question whether an agency has
delegated authority to issue interpretations concerning its own
jurisdiction, even through notice-and-comment rulemaking. The
problem is that, in so doing, they disregard what little guidance Mead
provides on the significance of notice-and-comment rulemaking for
Chevron eligibility. If justified in so doing, they nevertheless get Mead
a bit backwards. Courts read the decision as relevant to determining
when an explicit delegation of interpretive authority is necessary,
while it was intended to address when an implicit one is present.
Consider Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. v. FCC, in
which the D.C. Circuit invalidated Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") rules that required television programming to
include video descriptions because the rules were beyond the scope of
the Telecommunications Act.164 That Act added new provisions to the
Communications Act of 1934 for "closed captioning" and "video
163. Id. at 231-33 (requiring that Congress delegate authority to issue interpretations with
the force of law).
164. 309 F.3d 796, 798-99 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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description" technologies to assist hearing and visually impaired
individuals. 165 The Act required the Commission to prepare a report
on video descriptions and issue regulations on closed captioning. 166
After preparing the report, the Commission issued, after notice-and-
comment, rules mandating that television programming include video
descriptions.1 67  The court held that the FCC lacked statutory
authority to promulgate such rules.168
In articulating the standard of review, the court began with
Chevron. It described both Step One and Step Two, noting that "in
either situation, the agency's interpretation of the statute is not
entitled to deference absent a delegation of authority from Congress to
regulate in the areas at issue." 169 It then discussed Mead:
Mead reinforces Chevron's command that deference to an agency's interpretation of a
statute is due only when the agency acts pursuant to "delegated authority." The Court
in Mead also makes it clear that, even if an agency has acted within its delegated
authority, no Chevron deference is due unless the agency's action has the "force of law."
In this case, the principle question is whether Congress "delegated authority" to the
FCC to promulgate visual description regulations. Absent such authority, we need not
decide whether the regulations are otherwise "reasonable." An agency may not
promulgate even reasonable regulations that claim a force of law without delegated
authority from Congress.
17 0
The FCC had argued that the statute in question did not
foreclose jurisdiction, but created "ambiguity resulting in delegated
authority" to the agency.1 71  The court rejected the argument,
reasoning that congressional silence as to certain authority did not
entitle the agency to assert such authority. 172  Rather, express
congressional delegation is necessary.
Consider also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Abraham,
in which the Second Circuit held that an agency lacked delegated
authority to resolve a jurisdictional question.1 73 The case involved a
Department of Energy ("DOE") rule under the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act ("EPCA") that established reduced efficiency
standards for certain air conditioning units.1 74 The court determined
that the plain language of § 325(o)(1) of the statute precluded the
agency from issuing reduced home appliance efficiency standards after
165. 47 U.S.C. § 613 (1996).
166. Id.
167. Motion Picture Ass'n, 309 F.3d at 798.
168. Id. at 801.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 806 (citations omitted).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 355 F.3d 179, 184 (2d Cir. 2004).
174. Id. at 195.
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it published the original standards in the Federal Register. 175 The
agency had argued that it had not "published" the original efficiency
standards because it had suspended the effective date of those
standards. 176  The court disagreed, observing that "under its
interpretation, DOE could insulate itself from [the statute's] operation
indefinitely by... simply suspending indefinitely the standards'
effective date."'177
Although the court held that the plain language of the statute
contradicted the agency's interpretation under Chevron Step One, 178 it
nevertheless considered the level of deference that would apply to the
agency's interpretation of section 325(o)(1). 179 The court first expressed
general skepticism about deferring to an agency on a jurisdictional
question: "Given that the question at issue here is the degree to which
DOE's discretion has been circumscribed by Congress, we are
mindful.., that it seems highly unlikely that a responsible Congress
would implicitly delegate to an agency the power to define the scope of
its own power."180 The court then concluded, on the authority of Mead,
that "a lesser degree of deference than Chevron-level" would apply to
the agency's interpretation, assuming the statute was ambiguous.18'
The court reasoned that "interpreting the application of section
325(o)(1) is not part of DOE's delineated duties to promulgate
efficiency standards, which were explicitly delegated to DOE by
Congress in the EPCA and intended to carry the force of law.' 8 2
Thus, the agency lacked the express delegated authority that Mead
requires for Chevron deference. 83 In the absence of such authority,
the DOE had no interpretive power to enlarge its regulatory power
over efficiency standards.
175. Id. at 195-97.
176. Id. at 197.
177. Id. at 200.
178. Id. at 199.
179. Id.
180. Id. (quotations omitted).
181. Id. at 200.
182. Id. at 201 (emphasis in the original). The court offered two other reasons that Chevron
deference would not apply to the agency's interpretation. It found that the agency's
interpretation "did not go through the full notice-and-comment procedures laid out in EPCA...
and is more in the nature of an interpretive rule than legislative one." Id. While the DOE had
issued the revised efficiency standards through notice-and-comment rulemaking, it had not
expressly ventilated the interpretation of section 325(o)(1) concerning the "publication" of the
original standards. Id. The court also found that the "DOE's interpretation followed the
petitioners' suits in both this court and the district court arguing that section 325(o)(1)
constrained its ability to rescind the original standards and replace them with weaker standards,
and thus was arguably an interpretation advanced in contemplation of litigation." Id. at 201.
183. Id. at 200.
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In the above cases, the courts cite Mead in determining
whether an agency has the power to issue interpretations concerning
the scope of its own authority, even through notice-and-comment
rulemaking.184 At first glance, one might think that these courts use
Mead in an unexceptional way, as reaffirming what always has been a
necessary condition of Chevron deference (i.e., that an agency possess
delegated authority to issue interpretations that resolve statutory
ambiguities). Upon further reflection, one might even think that
courts use Mead in a clever way: to address the longstanding puzzle
whether Chevron deference extends to jurisdictional questions.18 5
Courts long have debated whether Congress can "be presumed to
intend that courts defer to agency judgments about the scope of their
jurisdiction."18 6 The worry is that agencies might tend to expand the
184. See also Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (applying Mead
and holding that the FERC lacked express "delegated authority" to require public utilities to
relinquish their statutory right to file tariff rate charges as a condition of FERC approval of
agreements among such utilities, and to prohibit members from withdrawing from such
agreements without FERC approval); Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(applying Mead and holding that the EPA lacked express "delegated authority" to administer a
federal operating program beyond the borders of Indian country). Another case that falls in this
category emerged after the search that formed the basis for this Article. See American Library
Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 698-99 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying Mead and holding that the FCC
lacked "delegated authority" to issue broadcast flag regulations under the Communications Act
of 1934). Similar to these cases are those in which lower courts used Mead to determine whether
an agency possessed "delegated authority" to interpret a statute that gave responsibility to more
than just that one agency. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Bell Atlantic Penn., 271 F.3d 491,
515 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying Mead and holding that the state public utility commission lacked
"delegated authority" to interpret the federal Telecommunications Act).
185. See Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2674 (2003)
(noting that the Supreme Court has not resolved whether Chevron deference applies to
jurisdictional questions, and arguing that Chevron deference should not apply to such questions);
Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV.
989, 992-93 (1999) (same); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89
GEO. L. J. 833, 851 (2001) (noting that the Court has not resolved Chevron's relationship to
jurisdictional questions).
186. Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking
Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. 187, 219 (1992) ("Chevron does not require a court to accept an
agency's view of the scope of its delegated authority, jurisdictional or substantive. By definition,
Congress cannot have left this determination to the agency."); Merrill & Hickman, supra note
185; Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 203,
209 (2004) (arguing that agencies may pursue their own self-interest in interpreting statutes);
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 498 (1989) ("Cass Sunstein's pithy criticism of deference according
to Chevron - 'foxes shouldn't guard henhouses' - is a counsel not merely of prudence, but of
constitutional necessity." (quoting Panel Discussion, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in
a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 368 (1987) (statement of Cass R. Sunstein)));
Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 185, at 1009 ("agencies have no comparative advantage in
reading statutes and... agency self-interest may cloud its judgment); Cass R. Sunstein, Law
and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2099 (1990) ("The principal reason
[for an independent judicial role] is that Congress would be unlikely to want agencies to have the
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limits of their authority. But the countervailing concern is that courts
have no reliable means to distinguish questions involving the scope of
delegated authority from questions involving the application of
delegated authority. 8 7  As a result, courts might overstep their
bounds in determining the permissible limits of agency action.'
88
But if courts effectively invoke Mead to resolve this tension,
they create difficulties in the process. Courts infer from Mead that
they cannot presume that Congress intends to extend Chevron
deference to certain interpretations even if issued through notice-and-
comment rulemaking, including those addressing jurisdictional
questions. As a result, they ignore Mead's basic purpose. Mead,
which specifically requires that "Congress [has] delegated authority to
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law," does not
contain generic guidance on whether Congress has delegated
authority to the agency to act at all.'8 9 While Mead does contain some
guidance on notice-and-comment rulemaking authority, it recognizes
that such authority presumptively constitutes "delegated authority" to
authority to decide on the extent of their own powers. To accord such power to agencies would be
to allow them to be judges in their own cause, in which they are of course susceptible to bias.").
187. See Garrett, supra note 185, at 2674 ("It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a
question that concerns the agency's jurisdiction, which would merit independent assessment by
the judiciary, and a question of applying delegated authority to a borderline case, in which
deference to the agency's decision would be appropriate either when Congress has signaled that
agency views on the meaning of statutes should be controlling or when the judicial default rule
understands congressional silence as such a delegation."); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 185, at
910-11 (contending that the Court implicitly agrees that, as a practical matter, questions of
jurisdiction must remain within Chevron's domain).
188. See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2027, 2153-54 (2002) ("But the problem with that claim is that every statutory interpretation
implicates the scope of agency jurisdiction by defining what comes within the statutes over which
the agency has uncontested jurisdiction.").
189. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 218 (2001). As Professor Vermeule has
written, Mead does not contain "an abstract instruction" to the lower courts on "whether
Congress expressly delegated to the agency the power to take the very action that it did take."
Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 352 (2003).
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issue interpretations with the force of law. 190 Thus, courts disregard
the little bit of guidance that Mead does give concerning the
significance of notice-and-comment rulemaking for Chevron eligibility.
If the courts merely read Mead for a purpose broader or even
different than intended, they would raise little cause for concern.
Lower courts often read Supreme Court decisions in these ways and
raise no red flags. The real difficulty is that the lower courts, if right
to ignore Mead as to the significance of notice-and-comment
rulemaking, distort Mead in the process. 191 Lower courts understand
the case as relevant to the question when an agency needs an explicit
delegation to issue interpretations of statutory ambiguities (answer:
when those ambiguities define the scope of the agency's authority).
But the case addresses a different, if not opposite, sort of question:
when an agency has an implicit delegation to issue interpretations
with the force of law. As Professor Vermeule writes, "the central point
of Mead is to establish a series of indicators that reviewing courts
must use to discern when, absent an express delegation of authority
authorizing the agency action in question, Congress should
nonetheless be taken to have implicitly delegated the relevant
authority."' 92  Mead does not concern the absence of express
delegations but the evidence of implied delegations.
In short, lower courts read Mead in an uncomfortable fashion.
Mead does not address general questions of delegated authority or
impose specific limits on notice-and-comment rulemaking. But even if
it does, it does not speak to express delegations of authority to issue
interpretations. By using Mead to resolve the question whether an
agency is entitled to Chevron deference when issuing interpretations
of jurisdictional terms, courts confuse our basic understanding of the
decision.
190. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law:
The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 469, 471 (2002) (arguing that, after Mead, courts
still must determine whether a general grant of authority to make "rules or regulations"
encompasses the authority to make rules with the force of law).
191. Vermeule, supra note 189, at 352 (examining Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. FCC,
309 F.3d 796, 798-99 (D.C. Cir. 2002) and concluding that "[t]his analysis is a caricature of
Mead's prescribed approach. First, and most seriously, the panel seemed to assume that Mead
requires an express delegation of agency power; only on that assumption can we make sense of
the panel's claim that unless [the statute] supplied the requisite authority, the Commission must
lose. Not one sentence in Mead, however, supports this assumption.").
192. Id.; see also DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE 2003-
2004 106 (Jeffrey S. Lubbers ed., 2004) ("In application, Mead continues to confound lower
courts); Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative Law: An Empirical Study of the
Supreme Court's Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States v. Mead, 107 DICK. L. REV.
289 (2002).
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III. MEAD IN THE FUTURE
As Justice Scalia predicted, Mead has muddled judicial review
of agency action. Lower courts apply different analytical frameworks
to determine when Congress delegates, and agencies exercise,
authority to issue interpretations with the force of law. Furthermore,
courts avoid Mead and Chevron when Skidmore will do. Finally, they
disregard Mead's basic purpose and invert the case.
This Part asks where to go from here. To answer that
question, it reopens the debate over whether Mead is theoretically
defensible, because one thing is certain: If Mead is not theoretically
defensible, then its practical effects are not worth tolerating. The
following Part seeks to get at the debate in a modest way, by
reexamining the disagreement between the dissent and the majority
in Mead. Ultimately, this Part concludes that neither side gets it
right as a theoretical matter and proposes a new approach that is both
defensible in theory and workable in practice. Before turning to that
discussion, however, this Part briefly considers Justice Breyer's recent
attempt in National Cable & Telecommunications Association v.
Brand X Internet Services to clarify Mead. It shows that Justice
Breyer's effort does not eliminate the need for a new approach.
A. Decoding the Concurrence in Brand X
Concurring in Brand X, Justice Breyer endeavored to rebut
Justice Scalia's characterization of Mead as requiring 'some
unspecified degree of formal process' before the agency" for that
agency to receive Chevron deference. 193 Interestingly, the issue in
Brand X had nothing to do with Mead's asserted demand for
procedural formality. The interpretation in the case undoubtedly
reflected such formality because it was the product of notice-and-
comment rulemaking.194 But Justice Breyer and the other members of
the Court evidently were in the mood for clarification. 195 Indeed, the
193. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S.Ct. 2688, 2712 (2005)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting infra, at 2718 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
194. In Brand X, the Court considered whether the FCC's conclusion that "cable companies
that sell broadband Internet service do not provide 'telecommunications servic[e]' as the
Communications Act defines that term" was a "lawful construction of the Communications Act
under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555 et seq." Brand X, 125 S.Ct. at 2695. The Court held
that it was. Id.
195. See id. at 2702 ("Nevertheless, it is no great mystery why we are reaching the point
here. There is genuine confusion in the lower courts over the interaction between the Chevron
doctrine and stare decisis principles, as the petitioners informed us at the certiorari stage of this
litigation.") (quotations omitted).
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majority resolved an issue that it did not have to address: whether "[a]
court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference."'196 Holding that
prior precedent does not trump Chevron deference, the Court provided
much needed clarification on this issue for the lower courts. 197 As for
Mead, Justice Scalia invited clarification of that case by again
asserting his own characterization. Justice Breyer embraced the
opportunity. Unfortunately, his effort may do more harm than good.
On Justice Breyer's reading of Mead, "the existence of a formal
rulemaking proceeding is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation of a
statute."198  "It is not a necessary condition," he stated, "because an
agency might arrive at an authoritative interpretation of a
congressional enactment in other ways, including ways that Justice
Scalia mentions."'199 But the Court made this general proposition clear
in Mead itself.200  Furthermore, the "ways" that Justice Scalia
mentions amount to one example involving a "position taken by an
agency before the Supreme Court, with the full approval of the agency
head."20 1 Justice Breyer did not explain why or how agency litigating
positions, which traditionally have been denied Chevron deference,
may qualify. 20 2 Nor did he provide any other insight beyond a citation
to Mead, which only gave one example of a Chevron-worthy,
nontraditional process. That example involved the Comptroller of the
Currency, whose unique functions do not readily compare to those of
other officials or agencies. 203  Thus, Justice Breyer's purported
clarification on the status of procedures less formal than notice-and-
comment rulemaking is not much help.
196. See id. at 2700; id at 2702 ("As the dissent points out, it is not logically necessary for us
to reach the question whether the Court of Appeals misapplied Chevron to decide whether the
Commission acted lawfully.").
197. See id. at 2702.
198. Id. at 2712 (Breyer, J., concurring).
199. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
200. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) ('The want of [notice-and-comment
rulemaking] here does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron
deference even when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded.").
201. Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2718 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. See, e.g., NRDC v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 201 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting Chevron
deference for agency litigating position); In re New Times Securities Servs., Inc., 371 F.3d 68, 81
(2d Cir. 2004) (same); Chao v. Russell P. Le Frois Builder, Inc., 291 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2002)
(same); Ala. Power Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 307 F.3d 1300, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2002) (same);
Pool Co. v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 173, 179 n.3 (5th Cir. 2001) (same); Matz v. Household Int'l Tax
Reduction Inv. Plan, 265 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2001) (same).
203. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 231 (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256-57 (1995)).
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Furthermore, his attempted clarification adds a complexity
absent in Mead itself. In Justice Breyer's view, a formal proceeding is
"not a sufficient condition because Congress may have intended not to
leave the matter of particular interpretation up to the agency,
irrespective of the procedure the agency uses to arrive at that
interpretation, say, where an unusually basic legal question is at
issue. ' 204  Thus, Justice Breyer began to describe a category of
interpretations as to which Chevron deference may not apply, even in
the face of notice-and-comment rulemaking. But he did not continue
to describe that category of "unusually basic legal question[s]." He
offered only a single counterfactual reference as illustration, one
involving what is best understood as an agency's implausible assertion
of statutory authority.20 5
Could it be that Justice Breyer reads Mead to impose an
additional requirement on, or to create a special exception to, Chevron
deference for scope-of-authority or jurisdictional questions, as some
lower courts have done? Consider that Justice Breyer began his
concurrence by chiding the agency for its aggressive resolution of such
a question: "I join the Court's opinion because I believe that the
Federal Communications Commission's decision falls within the scope
of its statutorily delegated authority - though perhaps just barely."20 6
Maybe Justice Breyer intended to warn the FCC that it was treading
close to a line that, he believes, Mead draws for Chevron deference on
scope-of-authority questions.
Even if Justice Breyer has in mind a reading of Mead as
relevant to scope-of-authority questions, this reading is neither
obvious nor natural. As discussed above, any further condition on
Chevron deference for scope-of-authority questions - let alone
"unusually basic legal question[s]" - is not fairly attributed to Mead.20 7
That is not to deny the value in commencing a discussion or
uncovering the full Court's position on the relationship between
Chevron deference and jurisdictional questions. But Mead, which
concerns implicit delegations and unconventional procedures, contains
204. Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2713 (Breyer, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 2713 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline,
540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) and noting that the Court in that case "reject[ed the] agency's answer to
[the] question [of] whether age discrimination law forbids discrimination against the relatively
young").
206. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). As a result of the majority's opinion upholding the FCC's
interpretation in Brand X, the agency now has power under its "ancillary jurisdiction" to make
rules for information services, including email and instant messaging and the like. Id. at 2696
(noting that the FCC may regulate cable-facilitated "information service" under its ancillary
jurisdiction).
207. See supra Part II.C.
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no particular clues. Moreover, reading it otherwise (or even as
consistent with a particular position on the scope-of-authority issue)
does not make any headway on addressing the most serious source of
confusion that the decision generates in lower courts: the status of
procedures less formal than notice-and-comment rulemaking. This
Part now returns to that issue.
B. Rejecting the Dissent in Mead
Justice Scalia would abandon both Mead and Skidmore.208 To
the extent that Chevron rests on a presumption of congressional
delegation, Justice Scalia thinks the Court should not demand an
affirmative showing of such delegation.2 9 Thus, he argues that
Chevron analysis applies as long as the agency issued an
"authoritative" interpretation of the statute, regardless of the
procedures used.210 Furthermore, he believes that the Court should
not slice-and-dice levels of deference. 211 An agency cannot command a
little deference any more than it can possess a little delegation. It
either has interpretive power or it does not.
Justice Scalia's proposal has new appeal in light of the
evidence presented here. The proposal would eliminate the
problematic effects of Mead by eliminating the case. It would further
streamline judicial review of agency action by eliminating Skidmore.
Rather than deliver simplicity for its own sake, Scalia's proposal
recognizes that nuanced rules like the ones in Mead and Skidmore
have no use unless lower courts can meaningfully understand them.
Justice Scalia's proposal also is worth reconsidering because
his vision of judicial deference promotes political accountability far
better than the Court's version. 21 2 First, Justice Scalia's proposal
wrests from judicial control and remits to presidential control all
authoritative agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory
provisions and not just those issued through particular procedures.
Second, the proposal, by placing this interpretive role in
administrative hands, allows agency interpretations to evolve as
presidential administrations and executive priorities change. In both
208. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 250, 258 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209. See id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210. See id. at 258 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211. See id. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212. See Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper
Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 837 (2001) (noting that Justice Scalia's
position "may be grounded in the expansive visions of presidential authority (and hesitations
about judicial authority) he has voiced in other contexts").
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ways, Justice Scalia's proposal enhances the political responsiveness
of agency action - which, he claims, is what Congress intends and
what Chevron recognizes. 213  Perhaps democracy demands this
accountability for the administrative state.214
But Justice Scalia's strategy, while highly workable, is not
entirely defensible. "Authoritative" positions are insufficiently law-
like to command the force of law. An authoritative position might be
carefully considered. Thus, it might reflect the deliberation and
expertise we expect from agencies as compensation for their creation.
An authoritative position might be transparent. Thus, it might be
subject to the political control and public scrutiny we demand for
agencies as compensation for their lack of direct accountability. 215
Nevertheless, the constitutional structure arguably demands more
than careful consideration and transparency - indeed, more than
political accountability - when it comes to lawmaking. The
Constitution also demands consistent application, as evident in Article
I, the Due Process Clause, and elsewhere. 21 6  Thus, it requires
procedural formalities to promote predictable and fair lawmaking, not
213. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 244 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
214. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
978-79 (1992) (noting that political accountability has replaced judicial review of administrative
decisions); Richard J. Pierce Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 486 (1990) (same);
Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American Rulemaking, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 755-60 (1996) (noting transition from administrative expertise to
political accountability as discipline for agency rulemaking); cf. Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining
Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power
over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1242-43 (2002) (asserting a new
justification for judicial control of statutory interpretation).
215. This may not always be the case. "Authoritative" positions often are not carefully
considered or transparent. See Bressman, supra note 34, at 503-11 (offering examples). If they
are not at least transparent, they do not foster political accountability because they are not
subject to public scrutiny or response. Id. at 506. Professors Barron and Kagan can be
understood to address this objection by requiring Chevron-eligible interpretations to come from
those most visible and accountable within an agency - namely, the agency head. See David J.
Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 241. One
wonders, however, whether the visibility and accountability of the official automatically
corresponds to the transparency of the interpretation. Cf. Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2376-77 (2001) (limiting Chevron deference to agency
interpretations that reflect official, transparent presidential directives). And Professor Vermeule
predicts that the agency-head rule will be easy to gut. Vermeule, supra note 189, at 359 ("Given
the internal structure of agency hierarchies, nothing will be easier than for agency heads to
circumvent the rule, delegating decisions de facto while retaining de jure authority; and
reviewing judges will be hard pressed to discern when this has occurred.").
216. See Bressman, supra note 34, at 495-503 (describing the Constitution as dedicated to
the prevention of arbitrariness, which includes the prevention of special treatment at public
expense).
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simply accountable lawmaking. 217 Administrative law has followed
suit, relying on procedures simultaneously to facilitate accountable
agency decisionmaking and to prevent arbitrary agency
decisionmaking. 218 In this way, administrative law can be understood
to have incorporated (some might even say perfected) the
constitutional strategy for ensuring that government officials exercise
lawmaking authority in a legitimate fashion. One need not claim that
the particular procedures that the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"), for example, imposes are constitutionally compelled to
maintain that some procedures are constitutionally appropriate before
a court accords an agency interpretation the status of law.219
Because Justice Scalia would not demand particular procedural
formality, he is indifferent to the claim that all administrative
procedures are not created equal. 220 At one end of the spectrum,
notice-and-comment rulemaking "by its nature, facilitates the
participation of affected parties, the submission of relevant
information, and the prospective application of resulting policy." 22' In
addition, it "fosters logical and thorough consideration of policy" as a
result of the judicially-enforced reasoned decisionmaking requirement
that accompanies it.222 Notice-and-comment rulemaking translates
the legislative process to the administrative state, and then some.
Likewise, formal adjudication more than translates the judicial
process to the administrative state. It develops generally applicable
standards on a case-by-case basis, "afford[ing] important procedural
protections to individual litigants" in the process.223 But, as compared
217. Id.
218. Id at 470-74; cf. John Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 894
(2004) ("Prescribed lawmaking processes such as bicameralism plus presentment or notice-and-
comment rulemaking promote caution, deliberation, and accountability.").
219. Cf. Barron & Kagan, supra note 215, at 230-34 (arguing that an emphasis on
"proceduralism" is misguided).
220. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383,
1390-96 (2004) (comparing different agency procedures); see also Robert A. Anthony, Which
Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 26-31 (1990)
(noting differences among procedures and arguing that interpretive rules should not bind
citizens and courts); William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321
(2001) (describing range of "nonlegislative" rules); Manning, supra note 218, at 894
(distinguishing legislative rules, which are capable of binding with the force of statutes, from
nonlegislative rules, which are not); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 185, at 900-08 (noting
differences among procedures and arguing that only notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal
adjudication warrant Chevron deference); Strauss, supra note 212, at 803-04 (describing
hierarchy of agency law).
221. Bressman, supra note 34, at 541-42.
222. Id. at 542.
223. Id.
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to notice-and-comment rulemaking, it is, in some sense, a second-best
approach for formulating generally applicable standards. It
applies new rules retroactively to the parties in the case[,] .... excludes other affected
parties in the development of policy applicable to them, ... and tends to approach broad
policy questions from a narrow perspective - only as necessary to decide a case - which
decreases the comprehensiveness of the resulting rule and increases the risk that bad
facts will make bad law.
2 2 4
Other methods fall farther down the scale. Informal
procedures often produce generally applicable standards, yet they are
"less fair and deliberative than formal adjudication, which at least
provides procedural protections for individual litigants and the
possibility of intervention and amicus curiae filings for others
parties. ''225  Informal procedures are "retroactive and narrowly
focused[,] ... and less visible. '226 Furthermore, they often fail to bind
either the agency or the public.227 In any event, informal procedures
provide no assurance of fairness, deliberation or binding effect. Such
results are happenstance, if they materialize at all.
If administrative procedures are not all the same, Mead is at
least partially correct - reviewing courts should not treat all agency
interpretations identically. Rather, courts should give legal force only
to interpretations contained in procedures that reflect the indicia of
lawmaking authority.22 Justice Scalia's strategy (concededly) cannot
countenance such diversity.
C. Rejecting the Majority in Mead
Rejecting the dissent does not mean that the Court's project is
justified in whole. Scholars have argued that courts should give legal
force only to interpretations contained in notice-and-comment
rulemaking, and perhaps formal adjudication, because such
procedures are the best for making general policy.229 Of course, the
Court has taken a broader view. In Mead and Barnhart, it
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 543.
227. Id.
228. Of course, agencies remain free to select any procedure they desire. See SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201-03 (1947) (stating that agencies have a choice among procedures). But
they cannot expect the same legal treatment regardless of their choice.
229. Bressman, supra note 34, at 541-44 (arguing that Mead should have established a
preference for notice-and-comment rulemaking); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 185, at 884-85
(arguing that Chevron deference should be restricted to legislative rules and binding
adjudications).
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acknowledged the possibility that courts could give legal force to
interpretations contained in some unspecified informal procedures. 230
Why would the Court preserve the possibility that
interpretations contained in informal procedures might qualify for
Chevron deference? Why not sacrifice the marginal cases in favor of a
sharper rule that might provide courts and agencies with greater
guidance? The answer cannot be the one that many scholars have
given for why the Court wrote Mead in the first place - namely,
judicial aggrandizement. Scholars claim that the Court wrote Mead
because it wanted to regain the interpretive power that courts lost to
Chevron by increasing the hurdles that agencies face under
Chevron.231 But even if judicial aggrandizement can account for Mead
generally, it cannot explain why the Court refused to draw the
Chevron line at the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking and
formal adjudication. If the Court had so restricted Chevron deference,
it would have maximized judicial interpretive authority. Unless an
agency uses delegated notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication authority, courts would get interpretive control.
Judicial minimalism, rather than judicial aggrandizement,
better explains the Court's apparent reluctance to create a bright-line
rule. In essence, the Court refused in Mead to preclude Barnhart, and
refused in Barnhart to preclude other cases involving informal
procedures. Thus, the Court refused to decide more than it had to.
Professor Sunstein has defended judicial minimalism as more than
recognizing the limits of judicial foresight, but also as cultivating the
advantages of political elaboration. 232 By refusing to decide more than
it has to in individual cases, the Court leaves political officials "room
in which to adapt to coming developments, to produce mutually
advantageous compromises, and to add new information and
perspectives to legal issues."233
230. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001); Barnhart v. Walton, 535
U.S. 212, 221-22 (2002).
231. See, e.g., Michael P. Healy, Spurious Interpretation Redux: Mead and the Shrinking
Domain of Statutory Ambiguity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 677-81 (2002) (arguing that Mead shifts
interpretive authority from agencies to courts); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?:
Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV.
735, 751 (2002) (arguing that Mead represents "a naked power grab by the federal courts");
Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 771, 793-94
(2002) (contending that Mead gives courts too large a role in denying agencies the deference that
they are due).
232. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
53 (1999); Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term - Foreword: The New Constitutional
Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARv. L. REV. 29, 92-96 (1999)
(arguing that the current Court subscribes to judicial minimalism).
233. SUNSTEIN, supra note 231, at 53.
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Here, we might view the Court as giving Congress latitude to
experiment with different forms of administrative lawmaking
authority. In this vein, consider the Court's own characterization of
its project:
Underlying the position we take here.., is a choice about the best way to deal with an
inescapable feature of the body of congressional legislation authorizing administrative
action. That feature is the great variety of ways in which the laws invest the
Government's administrative arms with discretion, and with procedures for exercising
it, in giving meaning to Acts of Congress.... If the primary objective is to simplify the
judicial process of giving or withholding deference, then the diversity of statutes
authorizing discretionary administrative action must be declared irrelevant or
minimized. If, on the other hand, it is simply implausible that Congress intended such a
broad range of statutory authority to produce only two varieties of administrative
action, demanding either Chevron deference or none at all, then the breadth of the
spectrum of possible agency action must be taken into account. 234
We might put a finer point on this general nod to congressional
intent. The Court can be seen as giving Congress latitude to reform or
update traditional administrative procedures, creating forms of
administrative lawmaking authority that are more efficient than
notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication. Scholars
have argued for years that notice-and-comment rulemaking is too
stultifying.235 It creates a potentially endless cycle of public comment
and judicial review, forcing agencies to refrain from issuing new
regulations or revising old ones. It is ill-adapted to many
technological and scientific problems, requiring agencies "to set
achievable levels of compliance based on speculation when they more
fruitfully might experiment with proposed levels," and "to produce
rules that, by the time they are final, already have outlived their
usefulness because technological or scientific advances have
superseded them. ' 236  It is rigid, "prohibit[ing] agencies from
234. Mead, 533 U.S. at 235-36.
235. The "ossification" literature is enormous. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE
VICIOUS CIRCLE 49 (1993); JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO
SAFETY 19, 199-200, 224-54 (1990); William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary
and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals
Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 393 (2000); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some
Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Peter L. Strauss,
The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1471-72 (1992); Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial
Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric
Utility Industry, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 763; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency
Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 71 (1995); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Critique of Active
Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599 (1997); Mark
Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review
of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997); Paul R. Verkuil, Comment:
Rulemaking Ossification - A Modest Proposal, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 453, 453 (1995); Patricia M.
Wald, Judicial Review in the Time of Cholera, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 659 (1997).
236. Bressman, supra note 34, at 545-46.
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negotiating policy directly with affected parties, as they might through
settlement negotiations in an enforcement action. ' 237  Finally, it is
expensive, asking agencies to commit an inordinate portion of their
budgets. 238
Formal adjudication is limited as well. It is only suited to
contexts involving particular disputes. Even in these contexts, it is
cumbersome and costly because it typically involves trial-type
hearings.239  Indeed, this realization prodded agencies to choose
notice-and-comment rulemaking as the preferred policymaking tool
more often than the drafters of the APA had anticipated. 240 While
some agencies continue to use formal adjudication for the formulation
of generally applicable standards, most do not. 241
Mead leaves Congress leeway in which to rethink the tools of
administrative lawmaking authority. In this light, we might consider
Mead as Chevron's under-enforced nondelegation doctrine. 242 Mead
reflects the Court's refusal to second-guess Congress on the
particulars of delegating statutes, whether the substantive mandates
or the procedures for implementing them. As such, it might be
understood as falling in line with the Court's refusal to enforce the
nondelegation doctrine.243 In addition, it might be understood as
consistent with other cases, judicial minimalism aside, in which the
Court has declined to adopt "formalist and unbending rules" in
deference to congressional delegation.244 While acknowledging that
such rules "might lend a greater degree of coherence" to the law, the
Court has found that "they might also unduly constrict Congress'
ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I
237. Id. at 546.
238. Id. at 545.
239. See Magill, supra note 220, at 1391.
240. See id. at 1398 (noting the shift from formal adjudication to notice-and-comment
rulemaking, and attributing the cause in part to agency preference).
241. The National Labor Relations Board, for example, continues to use formal adjudication
for the formulation of generally applicable standards. See Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB's First
Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274, 281-82 (1991).
242. Cf. Barron & Kagan, supra note 215, at 241 (arguing that Mead should be read to
restrict agency heads from delegating interpretive authority to field officials).
243. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that
the Supreme Court has "almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the
permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law");
see id. at 373.
244. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 (1988) ("[O]ur present considered view is that the
determination of whether the Constitution allows Congress to impose a 'good cause'-type
restriction on the President's power to remove an official cannot be made to turn on whether or
not that official is classified as 'purely executive."'); Commodity Futures Trading Com'n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
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powers." 245  These cases, which allow Congress to create so-called
independent agencies and Article I courts, employ functionalist tests
to determine whether congressional delegation unduly infringes
executive or judicial power. 246
This view of Mead is not without difficulties. It assumes that
Mead gives room to Congress, when Mead in practice often gives room
to courts and agencies. In informal procedures cases, courts
frequently must infer congressional delegation from agency practice -
the statute is simply not that much help.247 Thus, courts must decide
whether an agency has exercised authority in ways that reflect indicia
of lawmaking authority, such that Congress may be presumed to have
delegated such authority. 248  Mead, therefore, is unlike the
nondelegation doctrine or the functional tests under which courts
determine whether to uphold authority that Congress clearly intended
to convey. Under Mead and Barnhart, courts must determine whether
to recognize authority that agencies assert, and Congress is presumed
to have conveyed. 249
Nevertheless, assuming that judicial minimalism or
functionalism is the most plausible explanation for Mead, the next
step is to ask whether it is an adequate justification. The costs are
evident. As this Article demonstrates, lower courts lack a clear sense
for how to apply the case. 250 This effect was a predictable consequence
of both judicial minimalism and functionalism, which by definition are
antithetical to judicial guidance. Justice Scalia rightly saw it coming.
Courts also engage in Chevron avoidance and Mead over-reading. 251
These effects also are attributable to the narrowness that accompanies
245. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
246. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689-90 ('The analysis contained in our removal cases is
designed not to define rigid categories of those officials who may or may not be removed at will
by the President, but to ensure that Congress does not interfere with the President's exercise of
the 'executive power' and his constitutionally appointed duty to 'take care that the laws be
faithfully executed' under Article II."); Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 ("[I]n reviewing Article III
challenges [to non-Article III tribunals], we have weighed a number of factors, none of which has
been deemed determinative, with an eye to the practical effect that the congressional action will
have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.").
247. See Barron & Kagan, supra note 215, at 212 ("Although Congress can control
applications of Chevron, it almost never does so, expressly or otherwise; most notably, in
enacting a standard delegation to an agency to make substantive law, Congress says nothing
about the standard of judicial review.").
248. Id. ("Chevron is judicial construction, reflecting implicit policy judgments about what
interpretive practices make for good government.").
249. To the extent that agencies are political actors in the sense that they are subject to
political control, perhaps Mead retains its minimalist/functionalist nature.
250. See supra Part II.A.
251. See supra Parts II.B & II.C.
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minimalist reasoning and the imprecision that attends functionalist
reasoning.
The question is whether these costs are offset by Mead's goal of
creating maximum room for congressional delegation (or
administrative/judicial innovation). That answer may well be no. But
a better approach might be to question the goal itself. The next
Section offers a reason why we might rethink Mead's goal and, in the
course, repair Mead's mess.
D. Rethinking the Case
1. Justifying a Return to Formalism
We might reject Mead because it permits Congress - to say
nothing of agencies - too much room to erode the procedures for
exercising administrative lawmaking authority. In this regard, we
might consider replacing Chevron's under-enforced nondelegation
doctrine with Chevron's equivalent of Chadha,252 Bowsher,253 or
Clinton.25 4  In those cases, the Court denied Congress room to
diminish the procedures for exercising lawmaking authority. It found
that Congress had violated the requirements of bicameralism and
presentment by creating the one-house legislative veto (Chadha), the
legislative-branch agency (Bowsher), and the presidential line-item
veto (Clinton). Perhaps it is outlandish to suggest that such
formalistic analysis might apply when Congress creates novel
lawmaking procedures for agencies, rather than for itself or the
President, because agencies (unlike Congress and the President)
already operate at a remove from the constitutionally-prescribed
lawmaking channels. But maybe they operate at too far a remove
when Congress gives them broad latitude to side-step notice-and-
comment rulemaking and formal adjudication, which have taken their
place as the administrative counterparts of the legislative and judicial
processes.
To illustrate, consider why the Court employs formalistic
rather than functional analysis when Congress creates informal
procedures for itself or the President. The following defense of
252. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating the one-house legislative veto).
253. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating power of Comptroller General,
removable by Congress, to identify automatic spending reductions).
254. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating presidential line-item
veto).
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Chadha resonates with the underlying goals of fairness and the
avoidance of arbitrariness:
The legislative veto allows Congress to assert a passive-aggressive form of control. A
legislative veto may be exercised without public hearing, report, or statement of reasons,
and may be passed without recorded vote. Thus, it clearly does not have the qualities of
the administrative action it reverses-such as participation, transparency, and
rationality. Furthermore, it does not even have the benefits of concerted action that the
Constitution typically demands for legislative action, which mutes the influence of
private groups, moderates the production of improvident law, and ensures that
whatever law is produced at least receives the assent of both accountable branches, or a
supermajority of one. In Chadha itself, the veto had the additional vice of determining
individual rights without procedural safeguards and without binding more than the
party to the ruling. Thus, it furnished no basis on which to assess fair application in a
particular case or promote predictable and consistent application in future cases-that
is, to prevent arbitrariness.
2 5 5
We could easily convert this description of informal legislative
procedures to one involving informal administrative procedures. Such
informal administrative procedures, as noted above, provide no
assurance of participation, transparency, and rationality. They do
little to prevent private interests or political officials from pressing
agencies for favorable departures at public expense. As a result, they
do not promote consistent application in future cases. Of course, some
informal procedures may exhibit positive characteristics, which is to
say the indicia of lawmaking authority. But good instances have not
persuaded the Court to waive constitutional guarantees in the
legislative and executive contexts. Although the Court has allowed
Congress substantial latitude to alter the locus of lawmaking power, it
has not allowed Congress similar room to alter the channels for
exercising such power. The Court has good reason; channels, like the
requirements of bicameralism and presentment themselves, provide
an important mechanism for controlling administrative power once
created.
In the agency context, the channels are not constitutionally
specified, but they are equally important. When the Court in Mead
chose not to restrict Congress or agencies to notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication, it allowed potentially significant
alteration of the channels for exercising administrative lawmaking
authority. 256 Whether it did so because it hesitated to narrow the
space that Congress has for designing flexible and efficient
administrative procedures or because it trusts that agencies and
courts working together will use their authority wisely, the Court
overlooked the countervailing concerns. Courts and agencies might
255. Bressman, supra note 34, at 520.
256. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).
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not do as much as they should to ensure that administrative
decisionmaking does not go awry. Or Congress might endorse
procedures for administrative lawmaking that really push the outer
limits, yet are difficult to reject on the margins. Blind faith is a poor
substitute for procedural formality. The latter ensures the basic
indicia of lawmaking authority; the former does not.
The upshot is that the Court might have done better in Mead to
adopt a bright-line rule, limiting Chevron deference to the fruits of
notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication. Such a rule
would restrict the force of law to interpretations that no doubt reflect
the basic indicia of lawmaking authority. Moreover, it would
eliminate potentially problematic procedural delegations of the sort for
which the Constitution generally, and the Court typically, have little
tolerance. We might advise the Court to amend Mead accordingly.
2. Moderating the Embrace of Formalism
We can, however, leave the door open just a bit to the idea that
Congress or agencies might at some point develop decisional processes
that do not fit neatly into the existing categories. Particularly in light
of the Internet, we might envision a time at which agencies
legitimately make law through means other than trial-type or paper
hearings. If it is unnecessary to restrict procedural innovation, we
would be wise to cultivate it. We can do so by articulating the outer
boundaries within which Congress or agencies legitimately may
operate.
Interestingly, we can articulate the boundaries by reading
Mead and Barnhart more narrowly than lower courts have read them.
Lower courts have read the decisions to present alternative
frameworks or optional factors for assessing Chevron eligibility. We
might read them instead to require comparable, minimum indicia of
lawmaking authority. Those minimum indicia must serve to evince
both considered judgment and consistent application. Thus, we might
read Mead and Barnhart to require (a) "deliberation" (Mead's term) or
"careful consideration" (Barnhart's term) and (b) binding effect (i.e.,
"the legislative type of activity that naturally binds more than the
parties to the ruling," as in Mead) or practical adherence (i.e.,
"longstanding" effect, as in Barnhart).257
In what sense do the factors within (a) and the factors within
(b) establish comparable indicia of lawmaking authority?
"Deliberation" obviously is a close cousin of "careful consideration," if
257. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230, 232; Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 219, 222 (2002).
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not an identical twin. They invoke similar notions of transparent and
well-reasoned decisiomaking. Binding effect and practical adherence
are not clear equivalents. Binding effect is immediate and irrevocable
until officially renounced, while practical adherence imbues an
interpretation with de facto 'legal" status over time. But binding
effect and practical adherence serve a similar function for Chevron
purposes. Binding effect is promise of consistent application, while
practical adherence is evidence of consistent application. Of course,
practical adherence is only of limited use. It does not apply to new
interpretations. New interpretations that lack legally binding effect
would not qualify for Chevron deference unless and until they
persisted over time. Neither would changed interpretations, at least
until the changed interpretation earned its own "longstanding" status.
Thus, binding effect together with deliberation or careful
consideration are the central considerations, with the caveat that a
consistently-held, well-reasoned interpretation can acquire Chevron
eligibility simply by virtue of duration. This caveat does not extend,
however, to interpretations contained in formats that never have
commanded Chevron deference. Interpretations contained in formats
unquestionably too informal to carry the force of law even before Mead
and Barnhart cannot acquire Chevron deference after Mead and
Barnhart simply by virtue of their longstanding duration. 258
Lower courts have not understood Mead and Barnhart to
require comparable, minimum lawmaking values. 259 Nor have they
understood Barnhart to emphasize whether an interpretation is
"longstanding."260 Thus, we would have to read Mead and Barnhart
differently than the lower courts have done, not only as reconcilable
but as demanding that an interpretation emanate from a procedure
that reflects both considered judgment and consistent application. We
also might have to read the cases differently than the Court intended,
although discerning precisely what the Court intended is what got us
258. See Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 486-88 (2004) (noting
that, while the "longstanding duration" of an agency interpretation typically should qualify that
interpretation for "particular deference," agency interpretation that appeared in an internal
guidance memorandum only commands Skidmore deference because it does not carry the force of
law).
259. Compare Krzalik v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 877-79 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.),
with id. at 882 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in the judgment) (disagreeing about the relationship
between Mead and Barnhart).
260. Indeed, Justice Scalia has said that the longstanding nature of an interpretation is
simply irrelevant to Chevron deference once we acknowledge that agencies should be able to
change their interpretations over time. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 226 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). Acknowledging that agencies should be able to change their interpretations over
time, however, should not prevent the duration of a particular interpretation from serving as
evidence that an agency has treated that interpretation as binding in practice.
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here in the first place. 261 In any event, nothing the Court has done or
said precludes us from reading the cases this way.262
Reading the cases this way is not only appropriate in theory
but advantageous in practice. It offers lower courts guidance in
applying Chevron, which should unify their approaches and ease their
discomfort whether or not the Court ever rethinks Mead. Specifically,
it instructs the courts requiring careful consideration that they are
only half right.263 It tells the courts requiring binding effect that they
also are only half right.264 It alerts the courts inclined toward Chevron
avoidance that their approach is no longer necessary. 265 And it clues
the courts inclined toward over-reading Mead that the decision is most
profitably read as protecting the exercise of lawmaking authority, not
as serving a more general purpose.266
This solution has weak spots, which must be noted. Although
the solution purports to create room for nonconventional procedures, it
may well establish a preference for notice-and-comment rulemaking or
formal adjudication because so few informal procedures, present or
future, will meet the test. Such a preference, though perhaps
justified, no doubt has drawbacks. The most obvious drawback is
efficiency. As previously discussed, notice-and-comment rulemaking
is ossifying, and formal adjudication is burdensome.267 These effects
are regrettable. But the Constitution strikes a balance between
efficiency and procedural formality, committing us to a certain degree,
perhaps a large degree, of inefficiency. As the onerous requirements
261. Conversely, this reading might be just what the Court had in mind. In the latest
encounter with Mead and Barnhart, the Court, per Justice Ginsburg, noted that the
"longstanding duration" of an agency interpretation typically should entitle that interpretation
to "particular deference." Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 540 U.S. at 486-88 (quoting
Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 220). The Court withheld Chevron deference, however, because the agency
interpretation appeared in an internal guidance memorandum of the sort that never has, and
still does not, command more than Skidmore deference. Id. In the end, the Court granted
Skidmore deference because the agency interpretation "rationally construed the Act's text." Id.
262. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and
Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 833 (2002) (stating that "nothing the Court [in Mead]
did or said precludes future decisions that brush away the fuzziness in the majority's exposition,
leaving us with a clear and defensible meta-rule"). In this respect, the Court's minimalism is an
advantage.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 102-125.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 126-138.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 140-153.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 165-185.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 235-242.
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of the legislative process attest, efficiency often yields to procedural
formality and the values it secures. 268
Another significant concern is that any incentive for agencies
to undertake notice-and-comment rulemaking inevitably will
generate, as Justice Scalia observed in Mead, a corresponding
incentive "to rush out barebones, ambiguous rules construing
statutory ambiguities, which they can then in turn clarify through
informal rulings entitled to judicial respect."269  This problem,
however, results not from Mead but from the Court's decision to leave
"intact the related but freestanding principle that reviewing courts
must afford an agency's interpretation of its own regulation
controlling weight unless that interpretation is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation."270  Many believe that this
freestanding principle is an anomaly and ought to be reformed. 271 To
the extent that any reading of Mead establishes a preference for
notice-and-comment rulemaking, perhaps it finally will prompt
change where change is long overdue.
CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia might say he told you so. Years after Mead, we
are no closer to determining when Congress has delegated, and an
agency has exercised, authority to issue interpretations with the force
of law. This Article highlights at least three different pathologies
among the lower courts. First, lower courts vacillate between two
different analytical frameworks for assessing Chevron eligibility for
informal procedures, without acknowledging the choice or the
difference.27 2 As a result, Chevron deference seems to turn more on
the particular test that a court follows than the particular procedure
that an agency uses. Second, because lower courts are uncertain when
Chevron deference applies, they often refuse to commit and grant
Skidmore deference instead or as well. 273 When a court refuses to
extend Chevron deference exclusively or at all to an interpretation, it
268. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO.
L.J. 523, 528-33 (1992) (arguing that the requirements of bicameralism and presentment in
Article I diminish the production of improvident law by making all law more difficult to enact).
269. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 246 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
270. Manning, supra note 218, at 943 (quotations omitted).
271. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 660-80 (1996); Jonathan T. Molot, The
Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with
the Judiciary's Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 103 (2000).
272. See supra Part H.A.
273. See supra Part I.C.
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effectively may reduce agency flexibility to offer new interpretations in
the future. Finally, lower courts have read Mead as relevant to the
general question whether an agency is entitled to Chevron deference
for interpretations concerning its own jurisdiction, ignoring what little
guidance Mead actually offers on the significance of notice-and-
comment rulemaking for Chevron deference. If justified in so doing,
courts nevertheless turn the case somewhat upside down,
understanding Mead as relevant to the question when an agency
needs an explicit delegation of authority to issue interpretations of
statutory ambiguities rather than when an agency possesses an
implicit delegation of authority to issue interpretations with the force
of law.
This Article proposes a way out of Mead's mess. It does not
follow Justice Breyer's recent attempt to clarify the case, concurring in
Brand X, because it does not find much there. It does not advocate
Justice Scalia's solution of abandoning the focus on procedural
formality because it argues that this focus secures values important to
agency lawmaking. Nor does it adopt the Court's current position,
which understands the importance of procedural formality but does
not take the lesson seriously enough. Mead and Barnhart preserve
the possibility that Congress or agencies could create procedures more
efficient than notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication
without clearly defining any outer boundaries on this power. If we are
to permit Congress and agencies some space in which to create new
policymaking procedures, we should insist on some basic limits.
Specifically, we should restrict Chevron deference to procedures or
interpretations that reflect transparency, rationality, and consistency.
We might even locate such limits in a narrow reading of Mead and
Barnhart themselves. In so doing, we could offer lower courts much
needed guidance to unify their approaches and reduce their
uncertainty.
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How Do Corporations Play Politics?:
The FedEx Story
Jill E. Fisch 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1495 (2005)
United States law extensively regulates corporate
participation in the political process. The rationale for this
regulatory scheme is a concern that corporate political activity,
particularly campaign contributions, will corrupt the political
process and enable corporations to obtain rents at society's expense.
Regulators, the media, and the public generally view corporate
political activity as illegitimate and distinguish it from operational
business decisions. Critics of corporate political activity advocate
ever-increasing regulatory restrictions and support their analysis
with empirical studies that purport to demonstrate the ability of
corporate donors to buy favorable legislation by making political
contributions to members of Congress.
This Article challenges the prevailing characterization of
corporate political activity as a distortion of the political process.
Using a case study methodology, the Article examines the political
involvement of one company, FedEx, in a series of regulatory reforms
over a forty-year period. Drawing upon the business context, the
legislative record, campaign finance materials, and interest group
analysis, the Article demonstrates that political activity has been an
integral component of FedEx's business growth and operations.
FedEx successfully used its political influence to shape legislation,
and FedEx's political success, in turn, shaped its overall business
strategy. Moreover, in identifying the specific components of FedEx's
political activity, the Article highlights the range of mechanisms
that corporations use to engage in politics, revealing that the
exercise of political influence is far more complex than the purchase
of political favors in a spot market.
Regulation is becoming an increasingly important factor for
United States businesses. As a result, corporations must integrate
political activity into their overall business strategy and must
develop and manage their political capital in the same way that they
manage other business assets. The FedEx story demonstrates the
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importance of politics to business and explains the growing
investment by corporations in political capital. It further explains
how the business world has responded, and will continue to respond,
to regulatory restrictions by developing alternative mechanisms for
exerting political influence. By understanding how and why
corporations participate in politics, policymakers can better address
concerns about the effect of corporate political influence.
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